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CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S
2008-2009 TERM
Madhavi M. McCall,* Michael A. McCall** & Christopher E. Smith***
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court's 2008-2009 term marked the end of a brief
"natural court"' period in which the Court's specific composition had re-
mained intact for less than four complete terms. The retirement of Justice
David Souter at the conclusion of the Court's term and his replacement by
Justice Sonia Sotomayor raises significant and interesting questions about
the how the Court will decide cases during its next "natural court" period.2
While most commentators are forward-looking in their speculation about
the implications of changes in the Court's composition,' there are still
strong reasons to examine the Court's recent past, including the most re-
cent term, because the past provides clues about developments that may
shape the future.' There are always important questions about the motives
and actions of a particular set of justices is interacting with each other in
attempting to shape case outcomes and the written opinions that will guide
lower court judges in future cases.' On the Roberts Court, such questions
include the Chief Justice's success (or lack thereof) in advancing his self-
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Louis.
** Associate Professor of Sociology, San Diego State University. B.S., 1999, University of
Akron; M.A., 1993, University of Akron; Ph.D., 2004, Washington University, St. Louis.
*** Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. A.B., 1980, Harvard University;
M.Sc., 1981, University of Bristol, England; J.D., 1984, University of Tennessee; Ph.D., 1988, University
of Connecticut.
1. A "natural court" represents a time period in which the same set of justices or judges work
together on an appellate court without any departures or newcomers. Christopher Banks, The Supreme
Court and Precedent: An Analysis of Natural Courts and Reversal Trends, 75 JUDICATURE 262, 262
(1992).
2. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Sotomayor Cast First Vote on Court, N.Y. TIMEs, August 19, 2009, at
A13, ("But the alignment of the justices in the Getsy case gave a preliminary indication that, as ex-
pected, the ideological fault line at the court was not changed by Justice Sotomayor's succeeding Justice
David H. Souter, who often voted with Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer").
3. See, e.g., Mark Sherman, Sotomayor to Change Supreme Court Dynamic, S. FLA. SUN-SENTI-
NEL, Oct. 4, 2009, at 6A ("But other disputes loom and, to cite just one area, Sotomayor will be watched
closely to see whether her past as a prosecutor makes her more sympathetic to law enforcement in
criminal cases.").
4. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Roberts Court Shifts Right, Tipped by Kennedy, N.Y. TIMEs, July 1,
2009, at Al ("Chief Justice John Roberts emerged as a canny strategist at the Supreme Court this term,
laying the groundwork for bold changes that could take the court to the right even as the recent elec-
tions moved the nation to the left.").
5. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, To Nudge, Shift or Shove the Supreme Court Left, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1,
2009, at WKI ("These days, Professor Stone said: 'The right side [of the Court] is very bold and con-
servative. The liberal side is not bold. They are incrementalists. They don't set the agenda. The old-
school liberal justices were simply more ambitious than Justices Breyer and Ginsburg.").
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professed goal of fostering greater consensus among the justices.' In addi-
tion, there are questions about the impact, influence, and voting behavior
of Justice Anthony Kennedy as the "middle justice" whose vote often de-
termines outcomes when the justices are deeply-divided on particular is-
sue.' And, as always, there are issues about the reasoning and arguments
put forth in the opinions of individual justices as they attempt to shape
both current and future developments in constitutional law and statutory
interpretation.
Examinations of the Supreme Court's criminal justice decisions often
illuminate the divisions with the Court as well as contexts in which unusual
majority coalitions emerge.' Criminal justices cases constitute a substantial
portion of the docket every term10 and typically do not force justices to
confront unfamiliar issues of first impression." Criminal justice cases may
raise controversial issues, such as the exclusionary rule,1 2 that have histori-
cally divided jurists and commentators who adopt "liberal" or "conserva-
tive" perspectives on the definition and scope of rights for criminal
suspects, defendants, and convicted offenders." However, criminal justice
cases may also illustrate issues in which specific justices possess a clear
viewpoint on a constitutional provision that is contrary to their usual pre-
dominant patterns of support for preservation, expansion, or diminution of
constitutional rights.14 Similarly, in the area of statutory interpretation,
6. Chief Justice Roberts Says His Goal Is More Consensus on Court, N.YTIMES, May 22, 2006,
at A16.
7. See Liptak, supra note 4 ("Justice Kennedy was in the majority 92 percent of the time and in
all but 5 of 23 decisions in which the justices split 5-to-4.").
8. See id. ("The current chief justice clerked for Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, a famous
strategist, and he seems to have learned some tactics from his old boss. . Instead of addressing the
broad issue, Chief Justice Roberts wrote a narrow decision. . ..He all but invited a further challenge.").
9. See Christopher E. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and Criminal Justice: An Empirical Assess-
ment, 19 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 161, 173 (2003).
10. For example, during the 2003-2004 term, the Supreme Court decided 33 criminal justice-
related cases out of 73 cases for which the Court gave complete hearings and issued opinions. Christo-
pher E. Smith, Michael McCall & Madhavi McCall, Criminal Justice and the 2003-2004 United States
Supreme Court Term, 35 N.M. L. REV. 123, 124 (2005).
11. During the 2007-2008 term, for example, except for the Court's extraordinary examination of
the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), other issues were
familiar matters, such as right to counsel, search and seizure, habeas corpus, and capital punishment,
that have been examined in many prior terms. Michael A. McCall, Christopher E. Smith, & Madhavi
M. McCall, Criminal Justice and the 2007-2008 United States Supreme Court Term, 36 S.U. L. REv. 33,
38-39 (2008).
12. See Liptak, supra note 4 ("What accounted for the incrementalism? A likely explanation is
that the chief justice did not yet have Justice Kennedy's unqualified support and was biding his time
until he did. Something similar seemed to be going on in Herring v. United States[, 129 S. Ct. 1692
(2009)], which cut back on but did not eliminate the exclusionary rule. The rule requires the suppres-
sion of some evidence obtained by police misconduct").
13. The terms "liberal" and "conservative" in this article characterize Supreme Court decisions
in the manner used in the Supreme Court Judicial Database in which "[1]ilberal decisions in the area of
civil liberties are pro-person accused or convicted of a crime, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant,
pro-indigent, pro-[Native American] and anti-government in due process and privacy." Jeffrey A. Segal
& Harold J. Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the Warren and Burger Courts: Results from the Supreme
Court Data Base Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103, 103 (1989).
14. Lipak, supra note 4 ("Justices Scalia and Thomas are apt to follow what they understand to
be the original meaning of the Constitution, even when the consequences might not align with their
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criminal justice cases provide illuminating examples of Supreme Court jus-
tices' approaches to understanding legislative enactments and advancing
legislative intent.15
This article examines the Court's criminal justice decisions in the
fourth term of the Roberts Court era through both empirical analysis (Sec-
tion II) and case analysis (Section III). These analytical approaches reveal
both typical and unexpected dynamics in the decision making of the Rob-
erts Court's justices.
II. EMPIRICAL MEASURES OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION MAKING
Table 1 summarizes the outcomes of the Supreme Court's 2008-2009
criminal justice decisions according to the direction of the Court's decisions
and the extent of disagreement among the justices. The terms "liberal" and
"conservative refer to support for individuals' claims (liberal) or support
for the government's side in a criminal case (conservative) respectively.16
While the percentage of cases with conservative outcomes (60.6%) was
higher than that for criminal justice cases in the prior term (50%)," it was
consistent with patterns for recent terms in which the Court trends toward
a majority of conservative outcomes in such cases.18  In the preceding
year's term, liberal outcomes predominated in divided decisions with two
or more dissenters (11 liberal outcomes v. 7 conservative outcomes), 19
while the most recent term's conservative orientation (12 conservative out-
comes v. 7 liberal outcomes) was more consistent with the patterns in other
recent terms.2 0 Presumably these patterns of outcomes reflect the particu-
lar mix of criminal justice issues addressed by the Court rather than any
notable differences in approaches to decision making by specific justices.2 1
policy preferences. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts[, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009)], for instance, Justices
Scalia and Thomas joined three members of the court's liberal wing to say that Constitution's confron-
tation clause requires crime laboratory analysts to appear at trial rather than submit written reports.").
15. For example, James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007), was a statutory interpretation
decision that illustrated how conclusions about the meaning of statutory language can divide the Court
in ways that differ from typical depictions of the divisions between the Court's liberal and conservative
wings. See Michael A. McCall, Madhavi M. McCall & Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the
2006-2007 United States Supreme Court Term, 76 UMKC L. REV. 993, 1032-33 (2008).
16. Segal & Spaeth, supra note 13, at 103.
17. McCall, McCall & Smith, supra note 11, at 38.
18. In the 2006-2007 term, for example, there were conservative outcomes in 64% of criminal
justice cases, McCall, McCall & Smith, supra note 15, at 994-95, and in the 2005-2006 term, the figure
was 57%. Christopher E. Smith, Michael A. McCall & Madhavi M. McCall, Criminal Justice and the
2005-2006 United States Supreme Court Term, 25 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 495, 499 (2007).
19. McCall, McCall & Smith, supra note 11, at 38.
20. In the 2006-2007 term, the Court produced 7 conservative outcomes and five liberal out-
comes, McCall, McCall & Smith, supra note 15, at 995-96, while producing 11 conservative outcomes
and 5 liberal outcomes in such divided cases in the 2005-2006 term. Smith, McCall & McCall, supra
note 18, at 499.
21. See Thomas R. Hensley & Christopher E. Smith, Membership Change and Voting Change:
An Analysis of the Rehnquist Court's 1986-1991 Terms, 48 POL. REs. Q. 837, 839 (1995) ("[s]ignificant
change [in Supreme Court voting patterns]. . .may be due. . to changing issues before the Court.").
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TABLE 1:
CASE DISTRIBUTION BY VOTE AND LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE
OUTCOME IN U.S. SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL
JUSTICE DECISIONS, 2008-2009 TERM
Vote Liberal Conservative Total
9-0 4 8 12 (36.4%)
8-1 2 0 2 (6.1%)
7-2 1 6 7 (21.2%)
6-3 2 1 3 (9.1%)
5-4 4 5 9 (27.3%)
Total 13 (39.4%) 20 (60.6%) 33 (100%)
In the prior term, there appeared to be a reduction in the number of
deep-divided 5-to-4 decisions, with such cases constituting only 18% of the
criminal justice cases.22 This development led to speculation by observers
that changes were occurring in the justices' interactions and decision-mak-
ing.23 As indicated by Table 1, such divided decisions constituted 27% of
the criminal justice decisions, a figure that did not match the Court's most
divisive moment-45% in 2006-2007,24 but was closer to the Court's more
typical performance in recent terms.2 5 Such patterns seem to indicate that
the particular mix of cases accepted by the Court during a specific term
determine the nature and extent of the justices disunity rather than any
discernible new trend in decision making under the leadership of Chief Jus-
tice John Roberts.
Table 2 shows that the Court's criminal justice decisions were divided
between constitutional and other kinds of issues. Consistent with the im-
mediately preceding terms, fewer than half of criminal justice cases in-
volved constitutional issues.26 The particular categories of constitutional
cases reflect familiar subjects for the justices, such as search and seizure,
right to counsel, and double jeopardy. However, within such familiar cate-
gories the Court inevitably is called upon to clarify the application of the
law to new issues, such as prisoners' entitlement to test DNA evidence 27
and forensic scientists' obligation to submit to cross-examination concern-
ing their laboratory reports.2 8
22. McCall, McCall & Smith, supra note 11, at 38.
23. Linda Greenhouse, At Supreme Court, 5-to-4 Rulings Fade, But Why?, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
2008, at Al.
24. McCall, McCall & Smith, supra note 15, at 996.
25. For example, in 2004-2005, 26% of the Court's criminal justice cases were 5-to-4 votes, Chris-
topher E. Smith, Michael McCall & Madhavi McCall, Criminal Justice and the 2004-2005 United States
Supreme Court Term, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 951, 957 (2006), and in 2003-2004, 33% of such cases were 5-
to-4 decisions. Smith, McCall & McCall, supra note 10, at 127.
26. McCall, McCall & Smith, supra note 11, at 38-40; McCall, McCall & Smith, supra note 15, at
996-97.
27. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
28. Melendez Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
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TABLE 2:
ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT'S
2008-2009 TERM












Arizona v. Johnson 30
Herring v. United States3 1
Safford Unified School District v.
Redding32
Bobby v. Bies3  3
Yeager v. United States34
Cone v. Bell3 5




Knowles v. Mirzayance 39
Montejo v. Louisiana40
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts4 1
Oregon v. Ice4 2
Vermont v. Brillon4 3
Abuelhawa v. United States
44
Boyle v. United StateS45
Chambers v. United StateS46
Dean v. United States
47
Flores-Figueroa v. United States
48
Nijhawan v. Holder490
United States v. Hayesso
Corley v. United States51
Puckett v. United States5 2
129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 781 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 2145 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 2360 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 1769 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 1446 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 1841 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 1411 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 711 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 2102 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 2237 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 687 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 1849 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 1079 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009).
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Crime-Related Immigration: Negusie v. Holder5 3
Habeas Corpus: Harbison v. Bell54
Jimenez v. Quarterman 55
Waddington v. Sarausad5 6
Lawsuit Liability/Immunity: Ashcroft v. Iqbal57
Pearson v. Callahan
Republic of Iraq v. Beaty59
Van De Kamp v. Goldstein60
Military Justice: United States v. Denedo61
Table 3 shows the liberal/conservative voting patterns of the individual
justices in criminal justice cases during the 2008-2009 term as well as their
participation in majority votes and authorship of opinions for the Court.
As was true in the preceding term,6 2 Justices Alito and Thomas are the
justices least likely to support individuals' claims in criminal justice cases.
Justice Stevens stands out as the justice most likely to support individuals
in such cases, thus occupying the same "most liberal" position on the Court
that he has occupied for most terms over the past two decades.63
Other critical elements that are illuminated by Table 3, as well as Table
4, which accentuates divisions within the Court by presenting only non-
unanimous decisions, concern each justice's membership in decision major-
ities and the authorship of majority opinions. Justice Kennedy's key role in
the Court is evident in his membership within the majority for more than
90 percent of non-unanimous criminal justice cases. The justices next most
frequently in the majority were Roberts and Ginsburg, whose frequency of
appearance in majorities was nearly twenty percentage points below that of
Kennedy. As has been true in the prior terms during the Roberts Court
era, since the retirement of Justice O'Connor, "who for years shared a
place at the [C]ourt's center[,]FalseJustice Kennedy [is] standing in the
middle, all alone [,so that] [n]ot only the lawyers, but also the justices them-
selves, are now in the business of courting him."' As in the Court's prior
term, Kennedy was so frequently in the majority and so often the potential
53. 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009).
54. 129 S. Ct. 1481 (2009).
55. 129 S. Ct. 681 (2009).
56. 129 S. Ct. 823 (2009).
57. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
58. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
59. 129 S. Ct. 2183 (2009).
60. 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009).
61. 129 S. Ct. 2213 (2009).
62. McCall, McCall & Smith, supra note 11, at 42.
63. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1995-96 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 74
U. DET. MERcy L. REV. 1, 6 (1996); Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi McCall, Criminal Justice and the
2002-2003 United States Supreme Court Term, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 859, 869 (2004) (examples of selected
prior years in which Stevens was the most consistently liberal justice in criminal justice cases).
64. Linda Greenhouse, Clues to the New Dynamic on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 3,
2007, at All.
6 [VOL. 29:1
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TABLE 3:
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES' VOTING BY DIRECTION &
PARTICIPATION IN MAJORITY OPINIONS, CRIMINAL











Alito 18.2% 81.8% 78.8% 2
Thomas 24.2% 75.8% 78.8% 3
Scalia 30.3% 69.7% 78.8% 4
Roberts 33.3% 66.7% 81.8% 3
Kennedy 33.3% 66.7% 93.9% 3
Breyer 54.5% 45.5% 72.7% 4
Ginsburg 57.6% 42.4% 81.8% 6
Souter 60.6% 39.4% 78.8% 4
Stevens 69.7% 30.3% 69.7% 4
Data regard 33 criminal justice decisions (13 liberal, 20 conservative).
TABLE 4:
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES' VOTING BY DIRECTION &
PARTICIPATION IN MAJORITY OPINIONS, NON-
UNANIMOUS CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISIONS,
2008-2009 TERM
# of Majority
Liberal Conservative In the Majority Opinions
Justice (% of Votes) (% of Votes) (% of Votes) Authored
Alito 9.5% 90.5% 66.7% 1
Thomas 19.0% 81.0% 66.7% 1
Scalia 28.6% 71.4% 66.7% 4
Roberts 33.3% 66.7% 71.4% 3
Kennedy 33.3% 66.7% 90.5% 3
Breyer 66.7% 33.3% 57.1% 0
Ginsburg 71.4% 28.6% 71.4% 3
Souter 76.2% 23.8% 66.7% 2
Stevens 90.5% 19.5%
Data regard 21 non-unanimous criminal justice decisions
(9 liberal, 12 conservative).
52.4% 4
deciding vote, that one might still assert that "[i]t was, once again, Justice
Kennedy's court."6 5
65. Linda Greenhouse, On Court That Defied Labeling, Kennedy Made the Boldest Mark, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2008, Al.
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With respect to majority opinions, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Stevens, the primary assigners of majority opinions,6 6 effectively distrib-
uted writing responsibilities in a mostly-even fashion, although Justice
Ginsburg wrote two more and Justice Alito wrote one fewer than the three
to four opinion range of the other justices. Although Ginsburg's voting
record in criminal justice cases favors individuals' claims more frequently
than government interests, all six of her majority opinion assignments came
in cases with conservative outcomes, and two of those assignments were
made by Justice Stevens when Chief Justice Roberts supported the argu-
ments of individual claimants.67 Less surprising was Chief Justice Roberts's
decision to assign to himself the majority opinions in two controversial,
divisive decisions rejecting a prisoner's claimed due process right to admin-
ister DNA tests to preserved evidence" and limiting the application of the
exclusionary rule.6 9 In the latter case, observers worried that lower court
judges might regard the Chief Justice's reasoning "as a green light to ignore
police negligence all over the place."o More importantly, there was specu-
lation from both the Chief Justice's admirers and critics that the decision
may reflect his first strategic step toward achieving a goal he expressed as a
young attorney in the Reagan administration, namely a "campaign to
amend or abolish the exclusionary rule."7
In the case of Justice Stevens, he assigned to himself the majority opin-
ion in a divisive case that refined search and seizure rules to limit the ability
of police to search an entire vehicle incident to the arrest of an individual
outside of the vehicle.72 Interestingly, the other majority opinions by Ste-
vens were assigned to him by Chief Justice Roberts, not self-assignments in
liberal decisions in which Roberts dissented."
Tables 5 and 6 show the inter-agreement percentages for individual
justices in criminal justice cases. Such calculations are used to identify pos-
sible voting blocs74 -groups of justices who support the same outcomes in
66. When the Chief Justice is in the majority, the Chief Justice assigns the majority opinion.
When the Chief Justice is a dissenter, then the senior justice in the majority makes the opinion-writing
assignment. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 133 (7th ed. 1992). When Chief Justice Roberts
dissents, Justice Stevens, with thirty-four years of service on the Court, typically is the senior justice in
the majority.
67. The two opinions assigned to Ginsburg by Stevens came in Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711
(2009), a 5-to-4 decision concerning judges' authority to impose consecutive sentences, and United
States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079 (2009), an interpretation of a criminal statute. The opinions assigned by
Roberts came in three unanimous decisions, Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009), Bobby v. Bies,
129 S. Ct. 2145 (2009), and Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446 (2009), as well as Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S.
Ct. 1283 (2009), a 7 to-2 decision.
68. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
69. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
70. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Eases Limits on Evidence, N.Y.TIMEs, Jan. 15,2009, at A17.
71. Adam Liptak, Justices Step Closer to Repeal of Evidence Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2009, at
Al.
72. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
73. Yeager v. United States. 129 S. Ct. 2360 (2009); Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769 (2009); Harbison
v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1481 (2009).
74. Voting blocs are determined according to the "Sprague Criterion." The Sprague Criterion is
calculated by subtracting the average agreement score for the entire Court from 100. The resulting
8 [VOL. 29:1
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a high percentage of cases. 75 No specific voting blocs are listed under ei-
ther Table 5 or 6 because, in the Court's most recent term, there were no
three-member or four-member voting blocs as there had been in several
prior terms with high inter-agreement rates between small groups of jus-
tices.7 6 The rates of agreement between individual paired justices were
lower this year as, for example, Roberts and Alito agreed in 76 percent of
non-unanimous cases, a high level of agreement, but one that was much
lower than their 90 percent level in the immediately preceding term.77 Sim-
ilarly, Ginsburg and Souter's agreement rate of nearly 86 percent in such
cases was higher than that of any other pair of justices, but still markedly
lower than their 100 percent rate in the preceding term. 8 Most notably, a
solid four-member voting bloc of justices (Alito, Roberts, Scalia, and
Thomas) agreed with each other with an average inter-agreement rate of 82
percent in 2007-2008,79 yet the inter-agreement rate for this foursome in
2008-2009 was merely 75 percent,80 two percentage points below the
Sprague Criterion" for identifying a voting bloc. Presumably, the inter-
agreement rates were affected by the specific issues decided during the
term that happened to divide justices who usually vote together in criminal
justice cases. For example, the 5-to-4 decision limiting police authority to
search automobiles incident to arrests created an unusual five-member ma-
jority, composed of liberals Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter along with con-
servatives Scalia and Thomas squared off against an unusual dissenting
foursome in which usually-liberal Breyer joined conservative colleagues
Alito, Roberts, and Kennedy.82
number is divided by two and added to the Court average in order to establish the threshold level for
defining a voting bloc. JOHN D. SPRAUGE, VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 51-61(1968). High levels of inter-agreement between justices do not mean that these justices
seek to vote together. Instead, the justices may possess the same values and policy preferences con-
cerning specific issues. As some scholars have argued, policy preferences are likely to be a primary
guide for a justice's decisions. FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS 11 & PAUL J. wAHLBECK,
CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 19 (2000).
75. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy voted together
with sufficient consistency in criminal justice cases during the 1997-1998 term to meet the definition of a
voting bloc. Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1997-98 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 23 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 443, 450-51 (1999).




80. This figure was calculated from the inter-agreement percentages in Table 6.
81. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
82. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
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TABLE 5:
INTER-AGREEMENT PERCENTAGES FOR PAIRED JUSTICES
IN U.S. SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL JUSTICE
DECISIONS, 2008-2009 TERM
Alito Thomas Scalia Kennedy Breyer Souter Ginsburg Stevens
Roberts 84.8 78.8 84.8 87.9 66.7 66.7 63.6 51.5
Alito 81.8 87.9 84.8 63.6 57.6 60.6 48.5
Thomas 87.9 72.7 51.5 63.6 60.6 48.5
Scalia 72.7 51.5 63.6 60.6 48.5
Kennedy 78.8 72.7 75.8 63.6






INTER-AGREEMENT PERCENTAGES FOR PAIRED JUSTICES IN
U.S. SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL JUSTICE NON-
UNANIMOUS DECISIONS, 2008-2009 TERM
Alito Thomas Scalia Kennedy Breyer Souter Ginsburg Stevens
Roberts 76.2 66.7 76.2 81.0 47.6 47.6 42.9 23.8
Alito 71.4 81.0 76.2 42.9 33.3 38.1 19.0
Thomas 81.0 57.1 23.8 42.9 38.1 19.0
Scalia 57.1 23.8 42.9 38.1 19.0
Kennedy 66.7 57.1 61.9 42.9







A. Unanimous Decisions8 3
There were no dissenting votes in more than a third of criminal justice
cases decided during the 2008-2009 U.S. Supreme Court term. Specifically,
Court members were unanimous in 12 of the 33 cases analyzed here, and
twice as likely to make a conservative, unanimous ruling (eight) than a lib-
eral one (four). We begin with a discussion of the conservative, unanimous
decisions.
83. Although Hedgpeth v. Pulido, raised criminal justice issues, this case resulted in per curiam
decisions and therefore is not included in this analysis. 129 S. Ct. 530 (2008).
[VOL. 29:110
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Michael Bies was charged and convicted in 1992 for the kidnapping,
rape, and murder of a 10 year-old boy.' After being instructed to consider
Bies's mild mental retardation in mitigation against aggravating circum-
stances, the jury concluded that the death penalty was appropriate in this
case." Following the United States Supreme Court ruling in Atkins v. Vir-
ginia8 that bars states from executing mentally retarded offenders under
provisions of the Eighth Amendment, an Ohio trial court ordered Bies re-
ceive new sentencing. The federal district court, later affirmed by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, held that Ohio had determined in prior
hearings that Bies suffered from mental retardation and, therefore, a re-
hearing to determine his mental capacity was barred under the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Under Atkins, the federal
court vacated Bies's death sentence and ordered life imprisonment in-
stead.8 9 Ohio appealed and the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause did not attach because the original jury had rec-
ommended the death penalty.9 0 Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg
held that Ohio had not had the opportunity to question and challenge thor-
oughly Bies's mental status because the legal issues surrounding the use of
mental retardation as a mitigating factor differ from those when consider-
ing if mental status eliminates the death penalty option' under Atkins. A
finding of mitigation does not need to be accepted by the state as qualifying
for an Atkins exception. The case is Bobby v. Bies.92
In Knowles v. Mirzayance,93 the Court found that Alexandra
Mirzayance's ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed to meet the
Strickland v. Washington9 4 standard for relief in a unanimous decision writ-
ten by Justice Thomas.95 Mirzayance had entered both a not guilty and a
not guilty by reason of insanity plea for murdering his cousin when he was
charged with first-degree murder for the offense. 96 Mirzayance confessed
to repeatedly stabbing (9 times) and shooting (4 times) the victim. 97 When
pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity are entered, Califor-
nia requires a two-stage trial process whereby determination is first made
as to the defendant's guilt and then the validity of the insanity defense is
assessed.98 Mirzayance's attorney presented medical evidence attesting to
84. Bobby v. Bies, 129 S. Ct. 2145, 2148 (2009).
85. Id. at 2148-49.
86. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).




91. Id. at 2153-54.
92. 129 S. Ct. 2145 (2009).
93. 129 S. Ct. 1411 (2009).
94. 466 U.S.668, 687 (1984) (requiring a defendant to show both that his attorney's performance
was deficient and that those deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of the case).
95. Knowles, 129 S. Ct. at 1415.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (Citing Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 1026(a) (West 1985)).
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Mirzayance's insanity during the guilt stage.99 The testimony cast doubt on
Mirzayance's ability to form the required premeditation to sustain a first-
degree murder charge, and could have swayed the jury to convict on sec-
ond-degree rather than first-degree murder. 100 Instead, the jury discounted
the medical testimony and instead returned with a verdict of first-degree
murder.'o Mirzayance's lawyer, after conferring with Mirzayance, decided
to drop the insanity defense, because the jury effectively had rejected the
diminished capacity argument by returning a first-degree murder convic-
tion.o 2 Mirzayance, on appeal, sought habeas relief from the federal
courts, asserting that failure to pursue the insanity defense constituted inef-
fective assistance of counsel in violation of the standards established in
Strickland v. Washington.'
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas rejected Mirzayance's argu-
ment. Thomas first found that under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act, habeas relief in federal court may not be granted unless
the defendant can show that the procedures used to convict violated clearly
established federal law." Here, the Court did not see the procedures as
violating clear federal law and, therefore, held that the state court was cor-
rect in refusing relief.' The federal appeals court had concluded that
while the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was unlikely to prevail,
counsel at least should have attempted to argue the insanity plea since the
defendant had "nothing to lose."' 06 Thomas found that the "nothing to
lose" argument was not a legal rule established by the Supreme Court and,
therefore, was not a point on which federal habeas relief could be granted
to a state court defendant. 0 7
Further, Thomas found that Mirzayance's claim failed under Strick-
land. Strickland requires a defendant to show both that his attorney's per-
formance was deficient and that those deficiencies prejudiced the outcome
of the case. 0 8 Here, Mirzayance's attorney had presented his client with a
cogent argument on the difficulties of convincing a jury that had already
rejected the insanity defense to now accept the insanity claim on nearly the
same evidence.1o' The decision was thoughtfully made, and represented a
strategic choice that does not meet the Strickland standard of ineffective





103. 466 U.S.668 (1984).
104. Knowles, 129 S. Ct. at 1418 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006)).
105. Id. at 1419.
106. Id.
107. Justices Scalia, Souter and Ginsburg did not join Thomas's analysis of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act.
108. Id. at 1420 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
109. Id. at 1420-21.
110. Id. at 1421.
[VOL. 29:112
2010] CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE COURT'S 2008-2009 TERM
Mirzayance failed to show that his trial was prejudiced by the error."' To
show prejudice, Mirzayance had to demonstrate that the outcome of the
trial reasonably may have differed but for the performance of counsel. He
could not accomplish this because the jury already had heard and dis-
counted the argument regarding his sanity.1 12 Consequently, Thomas
found that neither prong of the Strickland standard had been met and that
Mirzayance was not entitled to relief.
The Court also held in Nijhawan v. Holder'x3 that the definition of
"aggravated felony," for the purposes of determining whether alien re-
sidents are eligible for deportation, could include a general category of of-
fenses rather than a finding of which specific actions qualify for the
aggravated felony characterization. 1 14 Nijhawan was convicted of mail
fraud, although the jury did not find that his behavior had resulted in any
specific dollar loss to the victims."' Aggravated felonies for the purposes
of deportation require a $10,000 loss by the victim.116 During sentencing,
Nijhawan admitted that his actions cost his victims millions of dollars."
When the government started deportation hearings, Nijhawan argued that
his stipulation of losses was not related to a specific criminal action and,
consequently, that he could not be deported for a non-particularized find-
ing of loss."s The High Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, disagreed,
and held that a method of defining loss, without clarifying a specific dollar
amount, was proper.119
The Court clarified the "consent-once-removed" doctrine allowing un-
warranted searches under the Fourth Amendment and the limits on the
ability of individuals to sue for civil liberties violations stemming from the
unwarranted searches in the conservative, unanimous ruling in Pearson v.
Callahan.120 Utah officials sent informant Brian Bartholomew to buy nar-
cotics from Afton Callahan.12' Callahan allowed the informant into his
home where Bartholomew saw illegal drugs.122 Bartholomew left the prem-
ises, allegedly to get money for the purchase.123 Bartholomew then in-
formed Utah law enforcement of the transaction, was wired, and was
provided marked funds to purchase the drugs.124 He was allowed entrance
111. Id. at 1422.
112. Id.
113. 129 S. Ct. 2294.
114. Id. at 2298.
115. Id. at 2298.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2299-2300.
119. Id. at 2303.
120. 129 S. Ct. 808, 823 (2009).
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into Callahan's residence where, after the transaction was complete, of-
ficers entered and conducted a protective search, recovered the drugs, drug
paraphernalia, and the marked currency.125
The search was eventually deemed unconstitutional by the Utah Ap-
peals Court, at which point Callahan brought charges against the officials
claiming they violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal
searches and seizures. 126 Callahan argued that under the United States Su-
preme Court's ruling in Saucier v. Katz127 officials were not entitled to
qualified immunity.128 Saucier mandates the immunity claims are litigated
by resolving two questions: 1) was a constitutional right violated and 2)
whether the right was 'clearly established' at the time of the infraction.129
The officers in this case asserted that they were entitled to qualified immu-
nity because they were following the consent-once-removed doctrine that
allows police to conduct a warrantless search of a residence once consent is
given to an undercover officer.13 0 The High Court granted certiorari to
determine if the consent-once-removed doctrine permitted the search, if
the officials were liable for damages under Saucier v. Katz, and if Saucier
should be reconsidered.131
The federal circuit court hearing this case held that the consent doc-
trine applied to undercover police officers, but that court was unwilling to
extend the right to search if initial entry into the property had been ob-
tained by a police informant.132 Because police should have known that
the consent doctrine did not cover warrantless searches when only an in-
formant had gained access to a residence, they were not entitled to quali-
fied immunity under Saucier.13 3 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito
rejected that logic.1 34 Alito first noted that Saucier should be viewed as
providing guidelines for resolving qualified immunity cases, and should no
longer be considered as mandating procedure, although he recognized that
in many cases, adhering to the protocol is beneficial.135 Alito then held
that the conduct of the officers did not violate the second prong of Saucier
because they did not violate a "clearly established" constitutional right.13 6
Rather, Alito noted that five lower courts had upheld the consent-once-
removed doctrine and one of those courts upheld its use when initial entry
was gained by a private citizen acting as an informant and not a member of
125. Id. at 813-14.
126. Id. at 814.
127. 533 U. S. 194 (2001).
128. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 814.
129. Id. at 816 (citing Saucer, 533 U.S. at 201).
130. Id. at 814.
131. Id. at 815-18.
132. Id. at 814.
133. Id. at 814-15.
134. Id. at 823.
135. Id. at 818.
136. Id. at 822.
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law enforcement.' Because of these rulings, officers could have reasona-
bly believed they were not infringing upon Callahan's established constitu-
tional rights and, as a result, were entitled to qualified immunity.' 8
Justice Ginsburg's conservative holding in Rivera v. Illinois39 deter-
mined that a trial court's error in failing to grant a defendant's peremptory
challenge does not require an automatic reversal of a defendant's convic-
tion, assuming all jurors are qualified and unbiased to serve.140 Michael
Rivera, a Hispanic male, was convicted of the first-degree murder on an
African American teenager in a jury trial in which the judge mistakenly
disallowed one of Rivera's peremptory challenges.14 ' By that point, Rivera
had used preemptory challenges to dismiss two other women and one other
African American.142 Concerned that Rivera was using his peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory manner, the trial court judge eventually
seated the challenged juror.'43 Rivera was convicted and appealed.'44
Ginsburg's opinion for a unanimous Court first noted that the jurors
were deemed qualified and unbiased, and thus the good-faith mistake by
the trial judge in disallowing a peremptory challenge did not deprive Ri-
vera of a fair trial.'45 Specifically, Ginsburg reasoned that because state law
regulates peremptory challenges, states could choose to suspend use of
those challenges entirely without implicating due process concerns.146 Per-
emptory challenges are not mandated by the federal Constitution; failure
to provide them does not equal failure to provide a fair trial.147 Second,
because peremptory challenges are provided by state statute, failure to
properly accept a challenge does not, by itself, raise federal constitutional
issues. 4 8 Here, Rivera received a fair trial by an impartial jury (just not
one of his choosing), as mandated by the U.S. Constitution.149 Although
there may have been a violation of state law, the good-faith violation of
state peremptory challenge statutes does not require reversal under the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.o50 As such, the automatic re-
versal of Rivera's conviction is not necessary.' 5 '
The Court also made suing prosecutors for their activities that lead to
unlawful convictions more difficult through its unanimous ruling in Van De
Kamp v. Goldstein.'5 2 Thomas Goldstein's conviction for murder in 1980
137. Id. at 822-23.
138. Id. at 823.
139. 129 S. Ct. 1446 (2009).
140. Id. at 1456.
141. Id. at 1450-51.
142. Id. at 1451.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1454.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1453.
148. Id. at 1454.
149. Id. at 1456.
150. Id. at 1453-54.
151. Id.
152. 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009).
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was predicated in part on prejudicial mistakes by prosecutors.' Goldstein
alleged, among other charges, that the prosecutors had jailhouse testimony
from an unreliable source and failed to turn over impeachment evidence. 154
After obtaining habeas relief based on those claims from the federal dis-
trict court, Goldstein was released from prison and filed suit against prose-
cutors for failing to properly communicate certain facets of the case to his
attorney, and for failing to train others properly so as to guard against mis-
takes.15 ' Although prosecutors requested absolute immunity from their of-
ficial activities, Goldstein claimed that because he was not suing
prosecutors for their prosecutorial duties but rather for their administrative
duties, immunity did not apply.156
Justice Breyer delivered the unanimous opinion for the Court, holding
that prosecutors have absolute immunity regarding administrative duties if
those duties are intimately related to the trial process.15 1 While the Court
did not assert that all administrative duties performed by prosecutors (e.g.,
hiring, payroll administration) are covered by absolute immunity, those
that are related to the trial are covered, as are the reasons for the alleged
misconduct resulting in the unconstitutional trial proceedings in this
case.15 1 The Court also rejected Goldstein's claim that prosecutors are lia-
ble for failing to devise a system in which information could be transmitted
better, thereby making civil claims following tainted trials more difficult.15 9
The Court determined in Arizona v. Johnsonl6 0 that the "stop and
frisk" exception to the Fourth Amendment established in Terry v. Ohio"'1
applied to the pat down of passengers of a car if the officer had a reasona-
ble concern for officer safety.162 Lemon Johnson was the passenger in a car
stopped for vehicle registration violations.16 3 Based on Johnson's suspi-
cious behavior, one of the officers asked him to leave the car for further
questioning. 16 4 Before questioning Johnson, the officer frisked Johnson,
asserting that his behavior had caused concern that he might be armed. 165
The frisk revealed a gun and Johnson was charged with a firearms' viola-
tion.16 6 He moved to suppress the gun as resulting from an unlawful
search, but the trial court did not suppress the evidence and Johnson was
convicted.16 1 The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the of-
ficers did not have cause to conduct a pat down because they had no cause




157. Id. at 861-62.
158. Id. at 862.
159. Id. at 864-65.
160. 129 S. Ct. 781, (2009).
161. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968).
162. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. at 784 (2009).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 784-85.
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to believe Johnson was involved in criminal activity.168 The Arizona Su-
preme Court denied review and the United States Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Ginsburg, reversed. Ginsburg argued that officer safety
trumped Johnson's Fourth Amendment protections in this case, allowing
the frisk as long as the officer could reasonably argue that concern for per-
sonal safety triggered the pat down.169
The Court also held in Republic of Iraq v. Beaty that American citizens
could not file suit against Iraq for cruel treatment.17 0 The Court's ruling,
written by Justice Scalia, determined that Iraq is not subject to lawsuits
filed in United States federal courts due to legislation passed by
Congress.171
In the first of four unanimous, liberal rulings this term, the Court held
in Abuelhawa v. United States1 72 that the use of the word 'facilitate' in the
Controlled Substance Act does not extend to an individual whose phone is
used to make a misdemeanor drug purchase from a dealer whose distribu-
tion of the drugs constituted a felony.173 Justice Souter wrote the
opinion. 174
In another case dealing with statutory interpretation, the Court deter-
mined the meaning of the work 'knowingly' as related to identity theft and
sentence enhancement in Flores-Figueroa v. United States.'75 In an opinion
by Justice Breyer, the Court held that the government must show that indi-
viduals accused of identity theft did so knowingly. 6 Moreover, a person
knowingly engages in identity theft if that person is aware that the docu-
ments being used belong to another person, but not if they believe those
documents to be fake (a random group numbers on a social security card
that do not necessarily belong to another person). 7 Justice Scalia filed an
opinion concurring in part and in judgment that was signed by Justice
Thomas.178 Justice Alito also filed an opinion concurring in part and in
judgment.179
Justice Thomas's decision for the majority in Jimenez v. Quartermanso
held that the one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas peti-
tion under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act does not
expire until one year after an out-of-time direct appeal is concluded.'
The Court's liberal ruling allows state court defendants more time to file
168. Id. at 785.
169. Id. at 786-87.
170. 129 S.Ct. 2183, 2195 (2009).
171. Id. at 2194-95.
172. 129 S.Ct. 2102 (2009).
173. Id. at 2105.
174. Id. at 2104.
175. 129 S.Ct. 1886 (2009).
176. Id. at 1888.
177. Id. at 1893-94.
178. Id. at 1894.
179. Id. at 1895.
180. 129 S.Ct. 681 (2009).
181. Id. at 683, 688-87.
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habeas petitions if their time for direct appeals to state courts has been
extended. 18 2 The Court held in this case that because the state court deci-
sion was not final, the habeas clock did not start until after the conclusion
of the out-of-time direct appeal."'
A unanimous liberal decision in Chambers v. United States' partially
clarified the meaning of 'violent felony' under the Armed Career Criminal
Act by holding that failure to report for a weekend confinement does not
constitute a violent felony and cannot be classified as one for the purposes
of enhancing sentences.18 5 Justice Breyer wrote the Court's decision. Jus-
tice Alito filed an opinion concurring in judgment that was joined by Jus-
tice Thomas.
B. Eight-to-One Decisions
Like in most recent terms, few U.S. Supreme Court decisions in crimi-
nal justice cases this term ended with a single dissenter.'"' Specifically,
only two criminal justice cases were decided 8-to-1 during the 2008-2009
term, both ended in a liberal outcome and in both Justice Thomas cast the
sole dissenting vote.
In one of the most anticipated rulings of this term, the Court held in an
8-to-1 vote that school officials acted in an unconstitutional manner when
they stripped searched a 13 year-old honor student in search of drugs based
on little more than an uncorroborated tip from a fellow student in Safford
v. Redding."' Savana Redding was a student at Safford Middle School in
2003.188 Redding was in math class when the school's assistant principal,
Kerry Wilson, asked Redding to follow him to his office.1 89 Wilson had
received word from another Safford student that Redding was planning to
bring prescription strength ibuprofen to school.190 Upon arriving at the
office, Wilson showed Redding a day planner containing knives, lighters,
and a marker.191 Savana admitted the planner-which she claimed to have
lent to her friend Marissa Glines-was hers, but denied ownership of any
of the other items. 19 2 Wilson then showed Savana five pills used for pain
and informed Redding that another student indicated that Redding had
182. Id. at 686-87.
183. Id.
184. 129 S.Ct. 687 (2009).
185. Id. at 691.
186. For example, of 361 criminal justice cases analyzed from the 1995 through the 2007 terms,
only 36 ended with a single dissenter. All other sizes of majorities were more common during this
period. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, MADHAVI MCCALL, & CYNTHIA PEREZ MCCLUSKEY, LAW &
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EMERGING ISSUES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 26 (2005); McCall, Smith, &
McCall, supra note 11, at 38; McCall, McCall, & Smith, supra note 15, at 995; Smith, McCall, & McCall,
supra note 18, at 499; Smith, McCall, & McCall, supra note 25, at 957; and Smith, McCall, & McCall,
supra note 10, at 127.
187. 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009).
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provided the pills to other students."' Redding denied the accusations and
agreed to let Wilson search her belongings. 1 9 4 When nothing was found in
Redding's backpack, she was taken to the nurse's office for a search of her
clothing.195
Once at the nurse's office, Redding was asked to undress to see if see
was concealing any pills on her person.196 Redding was asked
[T]o remove her jacket, socks, and shoes, leaving her in
stretch pants and a T-shirt (both without pockets), which
she was then asked to remove. Finally, Savana was told to
pull her bra out and to the side and shake it, and to pull out
the elastic on her underpants, thus exposing her breasts and
pelvic area to some degree. No pills were found.1 97
During this search, school officials did not contact Redding's mother,
who eventually filed a lawsuit against the school for violating Savana's
Fourth Amendment right against illegal searches and seizures. 198 The
school claimed Savana's rights were not violated and school officials were
entitled to qualified immunity.1 99 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the Reddings' position, finding that the search was illegal
under the United States Supreme's Court's ruling in New Jersey v. T.L. 200
and, because Redding's rights were clearly established at the time of the








200. 469 U. S. 325 (1985).
201. Redding, 129 S.Ct. at 2638. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and appeared poised, at
least according to observers in the courtroom during oral arguments, to overturn the Ninth Circuit and
rule against Redding. David G. Savage, Hearing on Strip Seach Justices Voice Concern on Banning
Such Searches on Students at School, Pitts. Post-Gazette, April 24, 2009, at A4. During oral arguments,
several justices appeared to lean heavily toward allowing the strip search, fearful that ruling against the
search would too strongly hinder school officials from dealing with the drugs in school. Justice Stephen
Breyer noted that, "[W]hen I was 8 or 10 or 12 years old, you know, we did take our clothes off once a
day. We changed for gym, Okay.? ... I'm trying to work out why is this a major thing to say, 'Strip
down to your underclothes,' which children do when they change for gym." Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 45, 58, Safford v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (No. 08-479). David Souter, typically a more reliably
liberal vote on Fourth Amendment issues than Justice Breyer, nonetheless noted, "My thought process
is, I would rather have the kid embarrassed by a strip search, if we can't find anything short of that, than
to have some other kids dead because the stuff is distributed at lunchtime and things go awry." Id. at
48. During the oral augments, only Justice Ginsburg strongly questioned the legality of the search. In
an interview and before the ruling was rendered, Justice Ginsburg lamented that her mate colleagues
may not understand the impact the search had on Redding: "They have never been a 13-year-old girl
.... It's a very sensitive age for a girl. I didn't think that my colleagues, some of them, quite under-
stood." Dahlia Lithwick, White Men Can't Judge? Why Sonia Sotomayor might really believe that La-
tina women make better judges, SLATE, July 13, 2009, http://www.slate.comlid/2220225/. (quoting
interview by Joan Biskupic of USA Today with Justice Ginsburg, in Washington, D.C. (May 1, 2009)).
When the ruling in Redding was delivered, many court observers were surprised that Savana Redding
had won the case. She not only prevailed, she prevailed 8-to-1, with only Justice Clarence Thomas
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The Supreme Court upheld the core holding regarding the illegality of the
search under the Fourth Amendment, but reversed the qualified immunity
ruling, finding Wilson was entitled to immunity.
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter noted that in T.L.O., the court
recognized that standard tests for reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment may not apply in school settings, and established that searches
on school property were permissible in scope if "the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intru-
sive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infrac-
tion." 202 Using that standard, Souter found that the facts of the case
supported Wilson's reasonable belief that Redding was involved in drug
distribution and that there was ample reason to justify the search of Red-
ding's backpack and her outer clothing. 203 However, while Wilson may
have had reason to search Redding's belongings, sufficient cause or suspi-
cion to justify the strip search did not exist.2 04 Rather, intrusive searches
like the one conducted here require that specific suspicions justifying the
search be evident. Schools must have a reasonable basis for holding that a
strip search will yield results before subjecting a student to that humilia-
tion.205 Because the concepts on which the Court based its Fourth Amend-
ment finding were not clearly established at the time of the search, Souter
further found that Wilson was entitled to qualified immunity.206
Justices Ginsburg and Stevens both filed opinions concurring in part
and dissenting in part. Justice Stevens, whose opinion was joined by Justice
Ginsburg, concurred in the Court's ruling that Redding's Fourth Amend-
ment right against an illegal search and seizure was violated, but held that
T.L.O. established clear guidelines for searches in schools that Wilson
should have known.20 7 Applying T.L.O.'s framework, Stevens noted that
the strip search was not justified at its inception, nor, he added, does it take
a constitutional scholar to understand that strip-searching a child is imper-
missible.208 As such, Stevens argued that Wilson should not have been
granted qualified immunity for his actions authorizing the search. 209 JUS-
tice Ginsburg also filed an opinion concurring with the Court's Fourth
Amendment holding but, like Justice Stevens, found Wilson's actions un-
protected.2 10 Ginsburg strongly held that, "Wilson's treatment of Redding
siding with the school district. What influence Ginsburg had in the outcome of Safford v. Redding is
unclear because observers are not privy to internal Court debates. However, the tone of the oral argu-
ments and the eventual outcome suggest that Ginsburg may have played a pivotal role in the Court's
finding of the search to be unreasonable.
202. Redding, 129 S.Ct. at 2639 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342).
203. 129 S.Ct. at 2641.
204. Id. at 2641-42.
205. Id. at 2643.
206. Id. at 2644.
207. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
208. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
209. Id. at 2645 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
210. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
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was abusive and it was not reasonable for him to believe that the law per-
mitted it." 2 1 1 The lone dissenter from the Court's core Fourth Amendment
holding in this case was Justice Thomas, who also filed an opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part. Thomas, however, concurred with the
Court's decision to provide Wilson with qualified immunity and dissented
from its holding that the strip search violated Redding's constitutional
rights.21 2
The Court's liberal ruling in Negusie v. Holder2 13 eventually might
make it easier for individuals to gain political asylum in the United States.
Federal law mandates that those seeking asylum from persecution cannot
themselves have been involved in the persecution of others (called the per-
secutor bar). Daniel Negusie, a dual citizen of Eritrea and Ethiopia, was
incarcerated by the Eritrean government for refusing to fight in a war
against Ethiopia.2 14 After two years, he was released from prison, but for
the next four years was forced to work as a prison guard himself and was
thus involved in the persecution of others.2 15 Negusie escaped and arrived
to the United States in a cargo container and applied for asylum.2 16 Al-
though the immigration judge found Negusie credible, Negusie was denied
asylum on the grounds that he had persecuted others.2 17
In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, and joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg and Alito, the Court held that the
immigrations courts should determine if the statute applies to those seeking
asylum who themselves were forced to participate in acts of persecution.2 18
The majority held that prior court decisions do not necessitate the reading
that those committing involuntary acts of persecution are barred from asy-
lum, but rather that the statute must be reinterpreted by the Board of Im-
migrations without reliance on a faulty interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent.2 19 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Alito, filed a concurring opin-
ion.220 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, filed an opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part.2 2 1 Although Justice Stevens agreed with
the majority that prior court precedent had been misapplied, he argued
that the Supreme Court should resolve the issue, rather than leaving it to
the Board of Immigration, and should find a duress exception to the perse-
cutor bar.22 2 Justice Thomas dissented, finding no reason to reconsider
Negusie's asylum request.2 2 3
211. Id. at 2646 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
212. Id. at 2646 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part & dissenting in part).
213. 129 S.Ct. 1159 (2009).
214. Id. at 1162.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1163.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1162, 1167-68.
219. Id. at 1166-68.
220. Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 1170 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
222. Id. at 1170-71 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
223. Id. at 1176-77 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
21
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
C. Seven-to-Two Decisions
The High Court decided an unusually large number of criminal justice
cases during the 2008-2009 term by a 7-to-2 vote. 2 24 For the most recent
term, all but one of the 7-to-2 decisions produced a conservative outcome.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Justice Stevens-often cast as a stalwart liberal
willing to disagree with the majority225-dissented in all but one 2 26 of the
seven conservative decisions and authored the Court's only 7-to-2 liberal
decision this term.
In that sole, liberal 7-to-2 decision, the Court extended the use of fed-
erally appointed counsel for use in state clemency hearings in Harbison v.
Bell.2 27 After the federal courts denied Tennessee death row inmate Ed-
ward Harbison's federal habeas petition, he requested state appointed
counsel to represent him at a state clemency hearing. 228 The Tennessee
Supreme Court denied the request and Harbison's federal counsel re-
quested that she be able to represent Harbison at his state proceedings.229
The lower federal courts denied the motion and the United States Supreme
Court reversed.2 30 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens found that
Harbison did not need a certificate of appealability to pursue the motion,
that federal counsel could continue to represent Harbison in a state clem-
ency hearing, and that said counsel could receive compensation for those
efforts.23 1 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas both filed opinions
concurring in judgment while Justice Scalia filed a decision (concurring in
part and dissenting in part) that was joined by Justice Alito.2 32 Scalia
agreed that a certificate of appealability was not needed, but disagreed to
the central point that federally-funded counsel could be used in state clem-
ency proceedings.233
224. It will be interesting to see if a potential pattern continues to emerge in the Court's criminal
justice decisions. During the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 terms, seven-member majorities produced 26%
of the Court's criminal justice decisions (16 of 61). Over the course of the four preceding terms, the
proportion of 7-to-2 decisions was only 9% (11 of 119). See McCall, Smith, & McCall, supra note 11, at
38; McCall, McCall, & Smith, supra note 15, at 995; Smith, McCall, & McCall, supra note 18, at 499;
Smith, McCall, & McCall, supra note 25, at 957; and Smith, McCall, & McCall, supra note 10, at 127.
225. See, e.g., 5 LEONARD ORLAND, John Paul Stevens, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 1789-1978, 158 (Leon Friedman & Fred Israel, eds., 1980) ("Stevens, in a number of
cases, in a variety of contexts, has been the only Justice to perceive constitutional infirmity on the
record before him." Soon after coming onto the Bench, Stevens established his willingness to dissent,
often as a sole dissenter. Id. Later, Stevens often found himself in the minority as the Court drifted
more conservative. WARD FARNSORTH, REALISM, PRAGMATISM, AND JOHN PAUL STEVENS IN REHN-
QUIST JUSTICE 157(Earl Maltz, ed.) (2003) ("[S]tevens turned out to be an ideal foil for the Rehnquist
Court's conservative majorities, being nearly their opposite in both substance and method.").
226. See discussion infra p._ (discussing an unusual coalition of judges constituting a 'conservative
majority' in U.S. v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079 (2009)).
227. 129 S. Ct. 1481 (2009).
228. Id. at 1484.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1484, 1491.
231. Id. at 1485.
232. Id. at 1491-98
233. Id. at 1494-95 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
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Shifting to the Court's conservative 7-to-2 decisions, Justice Alito
wrote for the majority that jury instructions in a federal Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) case sufficiently explained
to the jury the necessary conditions for a RICO conviction.2 34 Edmund
Boyle was part of a group of individuals who robbed a series of banks in
four states.235 The group consisted of core members, although others were
recruited when necessary.236 The robbers met to discuss their targets, dis-
tributed tools for various jobs, and split the proceeds.2 3 7 The district court
judge presiding over trial instructed the jury that to find a RICO enterprise
violation, the jury had to agree that a group, with or without a formal struc-
tural hierarchy, existed for the purpose of engaging in illegal activity.238
Boyle wanted a more specific instruction, contending that the jury had to
find an 'ascertainable structural hierarchy' in order to convict on RICO
charges.239
The Court's majority found the district court's jury instruction on
RICO sufficient, holding that Boyle's version adds requirements to the
RICO statute that are not necessary.240 Justice Stevens filed a dissenting
opinion, joined by Justice Breyer, asserting that Congressional intent when
passing the RICO statute was to sanction businesses and similar groups for
engaging in corruption.241 Boyle and his associates did not constitute a
group with any discernable structure or with business-like characteristics
and, therefore, were not an 'organization' under RICO.242 The trial court's
jury instructions were in error and violated Congressional intent, according
to the dissenting opinion in Boyle v. United States. 243
The Court's decision in Kansas v. Ventris244 held that informant testi-
mony obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel
guarantee can be used in court for the purpose of impeaching the defen-
dant's testimony. During a home robbery, Ernest Hicks was shot and
killed either by Donnie Ray Ventris or Rhonda Theel, or by both.245 Both
Ventris and Theel were charged with multiple crimes, including robbery
and murder, although the murder charges against Theel were dropped in
exchange for her testimony that Ventris pulled the trigger.246 Before Ven-
tris's trial started, police planted an informant in his cell and the informant




238. Id. at 2442.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 2245.
241. Id. at 2247-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 2251 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 2247-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
244. 129 S. Ct. 1841 (2009).
245. Id. at 1844.
246. Id.
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claimed to have heard Ventris confess to the shooting.247 Ventris then testi-
fied at trial that Theel was responsible for the robbery and shooting, at
which point the state introduced the informant's testimony to impeach
Ventris's statements.2 48 Ventris objected, citing that the information had
been obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but
the trial judge allowed the testimony and Ventris was convicted of aggra-
vated burglary and aggravated robbery, although he was acquitted of the
felony murder charge.249 The Kansas Supreme Court granted Ventris's
Sixth Amendment claim and the United States Supreme Court reversed.250
Writing for the majority of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ken-
nedy, Thomas, Souter, Breyer, and Alito, Justice Scalia found that the testi-
mony by the informant could be used for the purposes of impeaching
Ventris's credibility because, "[o]nce the defendant testifies in a way that
contradicts prior statements, denying the prosecution use of 'the traditional
truth-testing devices of the adversary process,' is a high price to pay for
vindication of the right to counsel at the prior stage." 251 Moreover, Scalia
wrote that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future bad be-
havior by police, but disallowing impeachment testimony is unlikely to fur-
ther that end.252 Because police are aware that properly obtained
testimony can be used at any stage of the trial, they are likely to ensure that
evidence is properly obtained. 25 3 Additionally, the use of impeachment
testimony requires the defendant to take the stand and make inconsistent
statements, something that the police cannot foresee.254 Thus, exclusion is
unlikely to act as a deterrent in these circumstances. Finally, Scalia noted
that other types of illegally obtained evidence could be used for the pur-
poses of impeachment.2 5 5
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, filed a dissenting opinion.
Stevens argued that because the evidence was obtained in violation of the
Sixth Amendment, as acknowledge by the State, the State should not bene-
fit from its unconstitutional behavior.25 6 Moreover, Stevens objected to the
majority's characterization of pretrial counsel rights as merely 'prophylac-
tic' in nature, as something less than or auxiliary to the actual right to coun-
sel at trial.257 Rather, Stevens contended, "[w]e have never endorsed the
notion that the pretrial right to counsel stands at the periphery of the Sixth
Amendment . . . . Placing the prophylactic label on a core Sixth Amend-




250. Id. at 1844, 1847.
251. Id. at 1846 (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (internal citation omitted)).




256. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 1848 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
258. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In a strong statement of disagreement, Stevens concluded that, "[T]oday's
decision is lamentable not only because of its flawed underpinnings, but
also because it is another occasion in which the Court has privileged the
prosecution at the expense of the Constitution. Permitting the State to cut
corners in criminal proceedings taxes the legitimacy of the entire criminal
process. "259
Justice Scalia wrote another conservative ruling for a seven-member
majority in Puckett v. United States,260 holding that the plain-error standard
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applies to forfeited claims. The
government refused to enforce a plea agreement reducing a sentence with
James Puckett when Puckett was involved in additional criminal activity
after the plea was negotiated but before sentencing.261 During sentencing,
when the government challenged the sentencing reduction agreement,
Puckett's lawyer did not object to the district court judge's eventual deci-
sion to allow the government to forgo the agreement and give Puckett a
higher sentence.2 6 2 Puckett did object to the government's violation of the
plea agreement on appeal, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Puckett had forfeited his claim by failing to raise the claim at trial.263 The
appeals court then applied the plain-error standard and found that al-
though error had occurred, Puckett did not show that the error had caused
prejudice.2 64 The High Court affirmed, holding that Puckett had forfeited
his claim, that use of the plain-error standard was appropriate, and that
Puckett had failed to meet this standard.2 65 Justice Souter, joined by Jus-
tice Stevens, dissented.266
In a challenge to the speedy trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, a
7-to-2 conservative ruling found delays to trial caused by appointed coun-
sel, as opposed to privately retained counsel, are not the responsibility of
the state, and therefore do not meet criteria necessary to claim a speedy
trial violation.267 Rather, the Court held although states appoint counsel to
provide legal services to indigent offenders, these attorneys act as agents of
their clients, not the state. Delays to the trial process caused by appointed
counsel are not the state's responsibility, and the state is not required to
ensure a speedy trial when the reason for delay stems from the actions of
defendant's appointed lawyer.2 68 The ruling in Vermont v. Brillon was writ-
ten by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
259. Id. at 1849 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260. 129 S. Ct. 1423 (2009).
261. Id. at 1427.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1427-28.
264. Id. at 1428.
265. Id. at 1433.
266. Id. at 1434 (Souter, J., dissenting).
267. Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S.Ct. 1283, 1287 (2009).
268. Id. at 1291-92.
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Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas and Alito. Justice Breyer, joined by Jus-
tice Stevens, filed a dissenting opinion holding that the case should be dis-
missed as improvidently granted.2 69
The Court also held in Dean v. United States that the federal govern-
ment only needs to show that a firearm was discharged, and not that the
defendant intended to discharge the firearm, to enhance sentencing. 270
Christopher Michael Dean was arrested for his participation in a bank rob-
bery.271 During the robbery, his gun was discharged, although witness ac-
counts appear to confirm that the gun went off accidently. 272 Dean was
sentenced to a mandatory 10-year prison term on the weapons count be-
cause the gun was discharged. 273 Had he only possessed the gun, the sen-
tence would have been five years and he would have received seven years
had he brought and brandished the weapon.274 Dean argued that the gov-
ernment must show that the gun was fired intentionally, and that accidental
discharge did not qualify for the enhanced sentence.275 The Supreme
Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, disagreed, holding
that an 'accidents happen' position was not a sufficient defense, and that
intent was not a required element of the sentence.2 76 Justices Stevens 277
and Breyer 278 filed dissenting opinions, both noting that the proper inter-
pretation of the statute is one based on a defendant's intentional, not acci-
dental, actions.
Another 7-to-2 conservative ruling, and one reflecting an interesting
alignment of justices, clarified the meaning of the words 'misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence' as included in an extension of the federal Gun
Control Act of 1968.279 Randy Hayes was convicted of "three counts of
possessing a fire arm after having been convicted of misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence." 280 Hayes argued that his 1994 conviction for battery of
his wife did not constitute a predicate offense because he was charged
under a general battery law and not under a specific domestic violence stat-
ute.2s The Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer and Alito, and in all but Part III by Jus-
tice Thomas, held that the Gun Control Act did not necessitate individuals
be charged under laws specifically focused on domestic violence, but rather
only that the domestic relationship be established beyond a reasonable
269. Id. at 1287 (Bryer, J., dissenting).
270. 129 S. Ct. 1849 (2009).
271. Id. at 1852.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1853.
275. Id. at 1853-54.
276. Id. at 1855-56.
277. Id. at 1856-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 1860 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
279. United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079 (2009).
280. Id. at 1083.
281. Id.
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doubt.28 2 Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, held in dissent
that the law had been read incorrectly and that a correct textual analysis of
the statute reveals that predicate crimes must be related directly to domes-
tic violence statutes.2 83 The case is United States v. Hayes.2 84
D. Six-to-Three Decisions
Of the Court's three decisions handed down this term by a six-member
majority, two are characterized as being liberal rulings. In the single, con-
servative 6-to-3 decision, Waddington v. Sarausad, the Court found that the
federal courts cannot provide habeas relief unless the state court engaged
in an unreasonable application of federal law.285 Cesar Sarausad was the
driver of a car involved in a drive-by, gang-related fatal shooting.286
Sarausad was convicted as an accomplice to the murder, but argued that he
was unaware that the gunman intended to fire, and instead thought that he
was only going to participate in a fistfight. 287 The prosecutor argued other-
wise, and used her closing statements to argue that Sarausad was "in for a
dime, you're in for a dollar."288 Sarausad was convicted and argued on
appeal that the prosecutor had not shown the he had intent to kill, that the
jury instructions were framed in such a manner as to confuse the jury and
allowed them to convict even if the state had not met its burden of showing
that he was aware of the specific crime in question, and, consequently, that
his conviction as an accomplice was wrongful. 289 The Washington appellate
court affirmed the conviction, holding that an accomplice must have a gen-
eral knowledge that a crime was imminent but that knowledge of the spe-
cifics of a crime was unnecessary.290 The Washington Supreme Court
refused to review, although in later cases that court did clarify that "in for a
dime, in for a dollar" was not the best description of accomplice criminal
liability because accomplices must have knowledge of 'the' crime under in-
dictment, not just of any crime that might take place.29 1 The state supreme
court nonetheless held that jury instructions used in Sarausad's case to de-
scribe accomplice liability were correct.292
Sarausad eventually applied for relief in federal court, and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of relief, hold-
ing that jury instructions were confusing and that the state court, by deny-
ing relief in spite of the confusing jury instructions, had unreasonably
applied federal law as established in the United States Supreme Court's
282. Id. at 1087.
283. Id. at 1089-91.
284. 129 S.Ct. 1079 (2009).
285. 129 S. Ct. 823 at 827 (2009).
286. Id. at 826.
287. Id. at 827-28.
288. Id. at 828 (quoting J.A. 123-24, May 23, 2008).
289. Id. at 829.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 830-31.
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ruling in, among other cases, Estelle v. McGuire.29 4 Writing for the
Court, Justice Thomas's majority opinion ruled against Sarausad, and held
that the Antiterrorism and Effect Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996
permits federal courts to grant relief only if the state court ruling is shown
to be both wrong and an unreasonable application of federal law.29 5 That
rule placed a heavy burden on Sarausad to show that the jury instruction
was interpreted by the jury in a manner that relieved the state's burden of
proving each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.29 6 Here,
Thomas held that Washington appellate courts were reasonable in ruling
that the instructions, which mirrored the state statute, were, in fact, not
ambiguous. 2 9 7 However, even if the instructions were ambiguous, they did
not taint the trial to the point of generating due process concerns according
to the majority.29 8 Rather, the jury had been convinced beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that Sarausad was more involved in the commission of the crime,
not just any crime, than he admitted, satisfying due process mandates.29 9
Thomas's decision was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Jus-
tices Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito.300 Justice Souter filed a dissent-
ing opinion that was joined by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens.or
Justice Stevens authored both of the Supreme Court's liberal, 6-to-3
decisions this term. In the first, the Court examined the conditions under
which individuals acquitted for some counts of an indictment but where the
jury hung on other courts could be retried for those elements on which the
jury could not reach a verdict.3 0 2 F. Scott Yeager was indicted following
Enron's failure for six counts of fraud and several counts of insider trad-
ing. 03 The fraud indictments collectively charged Yeager of engaging in
activity intended to mislead the public about the strength of Enron's busi-
ness model while the insider trading indictments argued that Yeager used
his knowledge of the company's poor prospective to sell stock while the
company stock prices were still elevated, netting him almost $20 million in
personal profits.3 04 The jury acquitted Yeager on the fraud charged but
failed to reach consensus on the insider trading charges and the govern-
ment, with some modifications, re-charged Yeager for insider trading.305
Yeager appealed, arguing that the acquittals on the fraud charges indicated
293. Id. at 831.
294. 502 U.S. 62 (1991).
295. 129 S. Ct. 823 at 831-32.
296. Id. at 831.
297. Id. at 832.
298. Id. at 833.
299. Id. at 833-34.
300. Id. at 826.
301. Id. at 835 (Souter, J., dissenting).
302. Yeager v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2360 (2009).
303. Id. at 2363-64.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 2364.
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that the jury had already found that he did not have the requisite knowl-
edge necessary to sustain an insider trading indictment and, therefore, the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred his retrial.30 6
Stevens' majority opinion, for Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ken-
nedy, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg, agreed with Yeager's position. The
majority held that respect for the jury's initial finding that Yeager did not
posses insider information necessary to convict him on fraud charges re-
quires that the jury's finding on fraud be used to conclude that the insider
trading charges could not be sustained.o7 The issue of Yeager's possession
of insider knowledge to commit fraud had already been litigated in Ye-
ager's favor; that fact could not be re-litigated under a different indict-
ment. 0 s Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and in
judgment, while Justices Scalia and Alito both filed dissenting opinions.
Justices Alito and Thomas joined Scalia's dissent, and Justices Scalia and
Thomas joined Alito's dissent. The case is Yeager v. United States. 309
In Cone v. Bell, a majority of justices decided that Gary Cone's consti-
tutional right to a fair trial had been violated when the state suppressed
evidence that might have led a jury to consider a shorter sentence. 3 10 JUS-
tice Kennedy joined the four liberals and cast the deciding vote to deter-
mine further the contours of the due process clause, although Chief Justice
Roberts did file an opinion concurring in judgment. Gary Cone contended
he was mentally ill in 1982 when he killed two individuals. 3 11 The jury
found him guilty and sentenced him to death.312 A decade later, Cone dis-
covered that the state had suppressed evidence that would have helped
confirm his mental illness, in violation of the Supreme Court's ruling in
Brady v. Maryland,314 and petitioned the state courts for post-conviction
relief based on the new evidence.3 1 s The state denied Cone's claim, hold-
ing that his Brady claim had been previously litigated. 16 Cone applied for
federal relief, but was denied because the district court found no federal
basis for Cone's claim, holding instead that the state court decision denying
a Brady hearing was based on independent and adequate state grounds.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and in an opinion written by
Justice Stevens, and joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Kennedy and
Breyer, held that the federal courts could hear Cone's case because the
state appellate court decision was not based strictly on state law. 318 Having
306. Id.
307. Id. at 2368.
308. Id.
309. 129 S. Ct. 2360 (2009).
310. 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (2009).
311. Id. at 1772.
312. Id. at 1175.
313. Id. at 1772-73.
314. 373 U. S. 83 (1963).
315. Cone, 129 S. Ct. at 1172.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1772-73.
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determined that the federal courts did have jurisdiction in this case, Stevens
proceeded to evaluate the merits of Cone's Brady claim. Stevens found
that although the suppression of the evidence would not have altered a
jury's determination of Cone's guilt or innocence-that the suppression of
evidence did not affect his conviction-it was possible that jurors might
have suggested a different sentence had they been aware of the evi-
dence."' Accordingly, the lower courts failed to adequately consider if the
evidence corroborating Cone's mentally illness would have had an impact
on the jury's sentencing recommendations.320 Based on this, the majority
deemed that the case should be remanded back to the lower courts to de-
termine if the suppressed evidence had a prejudicial effect during
sentencing.321
Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in judgment322 while Jus-
tice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.3 23 Al-
ito agreed with the majority that the federal courts had jurisdiction to
evaluate the case, but disagreed with its central holding that Cone was enti-
tled to a full review of his Brady claim as it related to sentencing.32 4 Justice
Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented.32 5 Thomas argued that if the
suppressed evidence was not sufficient to have changed Cone's conviction,
it is not sufficient to change sentencing and that review was unwar-
ranted.32 6 Moreover, Thomas disagreed with the majority and held that the
Court of Appeals had adequately litigated the Brady claim.32 7
E. Five-to-Four Decisions
In the most narrowly decided cases-those with a five-member major-
ity-the Supreme Court, during the 2008-2009 term, again produced a
nearly even number of conservative and liberal decisions.328 While five of
these split decisions held in favor of government (conservative), four deci-
sions favored the criminally accused (liberal). We begin our discussion
with the conservative criminal justice cases decided by the narrowest of
margins.
319. Id. at 1785-86.
320. Id. at 1786.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1186 (Roberts, J., concurring in judgment).
323. Id. at 1787 (Alito, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
324. Id. at 1788 (Alito, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
325. Id. at 1792 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 1792-93 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 1793 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
328. During several recent terms, the number of criminal justice cases ending in a five-member
majority often has been more evenly split between conservative and liberal outcomes than those cases
ending with a majority of six or more justices. For example, from 2003-2007 the Court handed down a
nearly equal number of liberal (23) and conservative (22) decisions in criminal justice cases with five-
member majorities. In cases decided by larger majorities during that same time, the Court generated
far more conservative (59) than liberal (43) decisions. McCall, Smith, & McCall, supra note 11, at 38;
McCall, McCall, & Smith, supra note 15, at 995-96; Smith, McCall, & McCall, supra note 18, at 499;
Smith, McCall, & McCall, supra note 25, at 957; and Smith, McCall, & McCall, supra note 10, at 127.
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Another atypical lineup of justices in Oregon v. Ice3 2 9 limited the reach
of Apprendi v. New Jersey330 by ruling that judges, without a jury finding,
can decide under state law to run sentences consecutively rather than con-
currently if the judge found additional defendant culpability.3 3' Thomas
Ice twice entered an apartment and sexually assaulted an 11 year-old girl,
touching the girl's vagina and breasts on both occasions.332 The jury found
Ice guilty of two counts of first-degree burglary with intent to commit sex-
ual assault and four counts of sexual assault.3 33 At sentencing, the judge
found that the two burglaries were separate incidents, allowing for consec-
utive sentences. 3 34 Further, the judge found that Ice showed a willingness
to commit more than one criminal action during each burglary, allowing
him to add consecutive sentences for two of the sexual assault charges.
Consequently, Ice was sentenced to 340 months.3 36
Ice challenged his sentence based on the Court's holding in Apprendi
v. New Jersey. In Apprendi, the Court held that any factor that enhances a
defendant's sentence must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.3 Ice argued that, in this case, the judge determined the factual
elements allowing for consecutive (rather than concurrent) sentences. 3
Ice claimed that because the jury did not make such a determination, the
sentencing violated the principles established in Apprendi.33 1 Writing for
Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Alito and Stevens, Justice Ginsburg refused to
extend the reach of Apprendi to prohibit this type of sentencing scheme.3 40
Ginsburg noted that states historically have had authority over their crimi-
nal justice systems and have trusted judges to determine if sentences should
run consecutively or concurrently.3 4 ' Oregon, while entrusting judges with
that discretion, have also taken steps to safeguard that judges will use that
discretion appropriately by asking them to attach their decision with a find-
ing of facts to justify a consecutive sentence over a concurrent one.342
Ginsburg found that the decision to impose consecutive or concurrent
sentences generally has not been within the purview of juries, but rather
has been determined by state legislatures.343 If state legislatures want to
vest that power in its judges, respect for state sovereignty demands that the
Court allow them that prerogative by not extending Apprendi.3 "
329. 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009).
330. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
331. Oregon, 129 S. Ct. at 714.
332. Id. at 715.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 715-16.
335. Id. at 716.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 717.
338. Id. at 716.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 719.
341. Id. at 717.
342. Id. at 719.
343. Id. at 717.
344. Id.
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Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Associate Justices Thomas and Souter.3 45 Scalia argued that
the ruling in Apprendi is clear: any factor that extends sentencing must be
found by a jury.34 6 The decision to run sentences consecutively enhances
sentences and, thus according to Scalia, the factors leading to that decision
should also be found by a jury and determined to exist beyond a reasonable
doubt.34 7 From this perspective, failing to do so violates the Sixth Amend-
ment right to a trial by jury. Scalia found no difference between the cir-
cumstances in Ice and those in other cases in the Apprendi line of reasoning
that do extend Sixth Amendment jury protections.3 4 8 He also found the
majority's position that judges have historically made the decision of how
to run sentences to be unconvincing.34 9 Scalia asserted that the Sixth
Amendment was violated by Oregon's sentencing scheme because a judge,
without a finding of fact by a jury, could double or even triple a defendant's
sentence that, according to Scalia, is precisely the type of activity Apprendi
was intended to prevent.5 o
The Court's conservative decision in District Attorney's Office v. Os-
borne3 s' held that defendants do not have a freestanding constitutional
right to obtain state held DNA evidence for private testing.352 The case
originated from a violent, sexual assault and attempted murder of a prosti-
tute in Alaska.353 Police eventually, based on testimony from a co-partici-
pant in the crime, focused attention on William Osborne, an African
American male, as the prime suspect in the crime.3 54 The state performed
DNA testing on sperm found in a condom at the scene of the rape, and was
able to exclude 80% of the black population as suspects. 355 However, be-
cause the DNA testing procedures were not more exacting, the testing
found only that Osborne, along with another 20% of the African American
population, could not be excluded as sources of the sperm.3 56 Based on
that, and other evidence, Osborne was convicted of kidnapping, assault and
sexual assault.357 Among other lines of appeals, Osborne filed for relief in
federal court, holding that he had a due process right allowing access to the
state's biological evidence in order to conduct more exacting DNA testing
at his own expense.5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
345. Id. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
346. Id. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
347. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
348. See. Id. at 720-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
349. Id. at 721 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
350. Id. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
351. 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
352. Id. at 2312.




357. Id. at 2314.
358. Id. at 2314.
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if defendants had a post-conviction federal right to access evidence for pri-
vate DNA testing.359
Writing for Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Alito and Thomas, Chief Justice
Roberts noted that the task of determining access to state evidence falls to
state legislatures and that forty-six States and the federal government (al-
though Alaska was not one of those states) had already addressed the
question of defendant access to biological evidence.36 0 Roberts continued
by writing that those statutes often place limits on access to evidence and
formalize procedures necessary to obtain such evidence. 3 61 Therefore,
Roberts concluded that the issue of access to state evidence is best resolved
by the state, not through a federal mandate.3 62 Roberts noted that if the
federal courts granted relief,
This approach would take the development of rules and
procedures in this area out of the hands of legislatures and
state courts shaping policy in a focused manner and turn it
over to federal courts applying the broad parameters of the
Due Process Clause. There is no reason to constitutionalize
the issue in this way. 6
Furthermore, Roberts held that while Osborne may have a 'liberty'
interest proving his innocence using evidence in the state's possession
under Alaska's laws, those state-created rights do not implicate the federal
Due Process Clause. 3 6 4 States, within the confines of their laws and state
constitutions, have flexibility in determining necessary post-conviction re-
lief procedures. 3 6 5 State post-conviction relief can be challenged in federal
court only if the state procedures are fundamentally inadequate by federal
substantive due process standards.3 6 6 Here, Roberts found that Osborne's
right to liberty was not violated through the use of Alaska's post-conviction
relief procedures.3 6 7 As such, Roberts asserted that exercising appropriate
judicial restraint required that the debate over the proper handling of DNA
evidence continue to be waged in the elected arenas and not be short-cir-
cuited by the federal courts.36 8 Justice Alito, joined by Justices Kennedy
and Thomas,3 6 9 found additional faults with Osborne's arguments in a con-
curring opinion.370
359. Id. at 2316.
360. Id. at 2316-17.
361. Id. at 2317.
362. Id. at 2320.
363. Id. at 2312.
364. Id. at 2319-20.
365. Id. at 2320.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 2320-21.
368. Id. at 2322.
369. Thomas joined only as to Part II.
370. Id. at 2323 (Alito, J., concurring)
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Justice Stevens-joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in full, and in
part by Justice Souter-dissented. Stevens argued that Osborne does have
a substantive due process right to access the evidence.3 71 Stevens found
considerable fault with Alaska's post-conviction relief practices used in this
case 3 7 2 and asserted that Osborne adequately attempted to have his claims
heard in state court but was "rebuffed at every turn." 73 Indeed, Stevens
contended that, "The manner in which the Alaska courts applied state law
in this case leaves me in grave doubt about the adequacy of the procedural
protections afforded to litigants . . . , thus making federal intervention
necessary.
Beyond the faults Stevens found with the state's treatment of this case,
he also asserted that Osborne has a more general right to access the evi-
dence under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Stevens wrote:
[A]n individual's interest in his physical liberty is one of
constitutional significance. That interest would be vindi-
cated by providing post-conviction access to DNA evidence,
as would the State's interest in ensuring that it punishes the
true perpetrator of a crime. In this case, the State has sug-
gested no countervailing interest that justifies its refusal to
allow Osborne to test the evidence in its possession and has
not provided any other nonarbitrary explanation for its con-
duct. Consequently, I am left to conclude that the State's
failure to provide Osborne access to the evidence consti-
tutes arbitrary action that offends basic principles of due
process.376
Justice Souter also dissented. Souter agreed with Stevens that
Alaska's post-conviction relief procedures used in this case were unconsti-
tutional but would not, through this case, advance to state prisoners a fed-
eral constitutional right to access DNA evidence.3
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,378 a divided Court determined the merit of racial
profiling claims stemming from the September 11, 2001, (9/11) terrorist
attacks. Javaid Iqbal, a Pakistani citizen, was questioned and detained by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation immediately following the 9/11 terror-
ist attacks on suspicion of having links to terrorism.37  Iqbal was further
371. Id. at 2331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
372. Id. at 2332 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
373. Id. at 2333 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
374. Id. at 2333-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
375. Id. at 2334 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
376. Id. at 2338 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
377. Id. at 2340 (Souter, J. dissenting).
378. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
379. Id. at 1943.
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determined to be an individual of 'high interest' and therefore was de-
tained in very restrictive conditions including 23 hours of daily confine-
ment.3 80 Iqbal served a prison term, was deported back to Pakistan, 3 8 ' and
preceded to sue agents of the FBI for the treatment he received as prisoner
of the United States government and for engaging in policies that interro-
gated individuals based solely their race, religion, or national origin.3 8 2
Iqbal sued government officials, including Attorney General John Ashcroft
and FBI Director Robert Muller, by filing a Bivens'"3 3 claim. Iqbal argued
that under governmental policies, only individuals of Arab decent were
designated as persons of interest and initially investigated and, once de-
tained, that Arab men were subjected to especially harsh conditions be-
cause of their race, religion or national interest rather than for any
legitimate penological purpose.
Writing for Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and
Thomas, Justice Kennedy first determined that federal appeals courts had
jurisdiction over the case. 8 Kennedy then turned to the merits of Iqbal's
claim and found that Iqbal had failed to show sufficient facts to justify a
claim of discrimination under Bivens.3 86 In order to survive review, Iqbal
had to show not only that the policies were discriminatory, but also that
they were adopted with discriminatory intent and that showing was not
evident in this case. Rather, because the '9/11 attacks' were carried out
by 19 individuals of Arab decent, Kennedy noted that, "It should come as
no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and
detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would pro-
duce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the pur-
pose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims."3 8 Justice
Souter filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Stevens, Gins-
burg and Breyer. 8
The Court also heard arguments regarding the 'good faith' exception
to the exclusionary rule in Herring v. United States. 390 In 2004, Bennie Her-
ring was arrested on what both parties agreed was police error.39 1 Because
the police department had not updated its system, officers arrested Herring
based on a warrant that actually had been recalled several months ear-
lier.392 During a search incident to the arrest, narcotics and a gun were
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 1944.
383. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971).
384. Iqba, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944.
385. Id. at 1945-46.
386. Id. at 1952.
387. Id. at 1954.
388. Id. at 1951.
389. Id. at 1954 (Souter, J., dissenting).
390. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
391. Id. at 698.
392. Id.
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found on Herring's person.3 93 Within a few minutes of the arrest and
search, the officers became aware of the error with the original arrest war-
rant.394 However, the state continued its prosecution for narcotics and gun
charges, despite the fact that both of those charges arose from evidence
obtained during an unconstitutional search. 3 9 5 Herring moved to suppress
the evidence at trial, but the judge allowed the evidence, finding that the
police had acted in a good faith belief that the arrest warrant was valid.39 6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and similarly held that the exclu-
sionary rule did not apply in this case. 9
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the purpose
of the exclusionary rule is to deter illegal police activity during criminal
prosecutions, and further wrote that this safeguard is not constitutionally
mandated, but rather is judicially constructed.3 98 In determining the appro-
priateness of the exclusionary rule, Roberts clarified that the exclusion
serves not as an individual right for specific defendants, but rather is in-
tended to deter future police misconduct. 9 If the actions in question were
the result of a mistake, then deterrence is unlikely and the value of exclud-
ing evidence is limited.4 00 If the police acted in 'good faith'-believing that
their actions were constitutional-then excluding evidence may be unnec-
essary, assuming the police acted in an objectively reasonable manner.40 1
Previously, the Court applied this good faith exception to an officer basing
an arrest on faulty information obtained from a court database 4 0 2 because
the officer lacked culpability when relying on information provided by
court employees. 4 03 Here, while the mistake did arise from police failure to
update their database, the error was not reckless or grossly negligent.4 04
Therefore, the exclusionary rule does not apply. 405 Roberts's opinion was
joined by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Alito, and Thomas.
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices
Breyer, Stevens, and Souter.40 6 Ginsburg noted that there was not disa-
greement among the parties that Herring's arrest and subsequent search
were unconstitutional.407 The arrest occurred because of faulty and care-
less maintenance of a police database.40 8 The only way to deter careless
393. Id.
394. Id.




399. Id. at 700.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 699-700.
402. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
403. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701. (emphasis added)
404. Id. at 704.
405. Id.
406. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
407. Id. at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
408. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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police behavior, according to Ginsburg, is to exclude faulty police work.4 09
The dissenting opinion asserted that in this case the exclusionary rule
should apply and that the narcotics and gun seized in the search incident to
the faulty arrest should be excluded.4 10 Ginsburg warned that the majority
had underestimated the potential problem of faulty recordkeeping, and
wrote that without the exclusionary rule there is no incentive for police
departments to invest time and other resources to properly maintain their
electronic records.411 Consequently, suppressing such evidence would de-
ter police departments from failing to update their records, justifying the
use of the exclusionary rule.4 12 Justice Breyer also filed a dissenting opin-
ion, joined by Justice Souter, and added that the mistake here was due to
police misconduct, and therefore, the Court's ruling that mistakes by court
personnel do not trigger the exclusionary rule, does not apply.41 3
The Court further restricted the rights of defendants against police ac-
tion in Montejo v. Louisiana.4 14 Jesse Montejo was arrested in 2002 on
suspicion of his connection to a robbery and murder that had occurred the
previous day.41 5 Montejo waived his Miranda4 16 rights,41 7 and the ensuing
police interrogation eventually led to his confession that he had shot and
killed the victim after a failed robbery attempt.41 8 Montejo was then pro-
vided a preliminary hearing and assigned counsel at state expense.4 19
Before Montejo met with this court-appointed attorney, police again ques-
tioned Montejo.420 Montejo waived Miranda a second time and agreed to
help police locate the murder weapon. 4 2 1 During the trip, Montejo wrote a
letter of apology to the victim's family4 22 and only upon returning to police
headquarters did he finally meet with his attorney. 423 At trial for first-de-
gree murder, the prosecution introduced Montejo's letter of apology.4 24
Defense objected to this, arguing the letter was obtained as a result of po-
lice questioning that was initiated after Montejo was represented by an at-
torney, and contrary to the procedures established by the Supreme Court
in Michigan v. Jackson425 forbidding police-initiated questioning of a sus-
pect once the suspect has requested counsel during a court proceeding.426
The letter was introduced, and the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the
409. See id. at 708 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
410. Id. at 705, 710 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
411. Id. at 708-09 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
412. Id. at 709-10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
413. Id. at 710-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
414. 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
415. Id. at 2082.
416. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).








425. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
426. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082-83.
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use of the letter because Montejo had been assigned counsel but had not
affirmatively requested counsel, or otherwise directly asserted his Sixth
Amendment rights.427
Writing for Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Thomas, and
Kennedy, Justice Scalia's majority opinion found fault with arguments
presented by both the state and Montejo.4 28 Scalia asserted that Louisi-
ana's reading of Jackson as requiring that defendants request or accept
counsel as unworkable. 4 2 9 However, he also held that Montejo's assertion
that once counsel has been appointed, the police may not initiate any fur-
ther contact with the defendant as unreasonable.4 3 0 Scalia noted that de-
fendants are initially protected through the use of Miranda warnings, but
that defendants may waive those warnings. 43 1 However, to protect defend-
ants who had asserted their Miranda rights from being hounded by police
into waiving them and then confessing, the Court adopted a rule in Ed-
wards v. Arizona43 2 that once a defendant has asserted Miranda, police
may not initiate questioning.4 3 3 That Fifth Amendment protection was ap-
plied to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in Jackson, with the Court
holding that any confessions made through police-initiated interrogations
after counsel is appointed are made because of an unconstitutionally ob-
tained wavier by the defendant of Sixth Amendment rights.434 In other
words, as Scalia explained, the point of Jackson is to, "[p]resume such waiv-
ers involuntary 'based on the supposition that suspects who assert their
right to counsel are unlikely to waive that right voluntarily"' 435 in subse-
quent interactions with police. However, Scalia noted that the purpose of
Jackson was to protect against police badgering, not to assure that defend-
ants are represented by counsel at each stage of the interrogation. 436 If
Jackson is intended to protect against police badgering, than Montejo's ar-
gument that police may not initiate contact with a defendant once repre-
sented by counsel fails because defendants are within their rights to waive
their right to be represented at any specific stage of the criminal
proceedings.437
The narrow majority held that defendants, while entitled to represen-
tation by counsel, are also entitled to speak with police without the benefit
of counsel if they choose.43 8 Moreover, while one might assume that a
waiver of rights by a defendant who actually requested counsel was ob-
tained through police misconduct, that same assumption cannot be made
427. Id. at 2083.
428. Id. 2083, 2085.
429. Id. at 2083-84.
430. Id. at 2085, 2087.
431. Id. at 2085.
432. 451 U. S. 477 (1981).
433. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085.
434. Id. at 2086.
435. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)).
436. Id.
437. See id. at 2086-87.
438. Id.
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for defendants who did not request counsel but were merely appointed
counsel by the state.439 Waivers by those individuals who did not assert
Sixth Amendment rights initially well might be voluntary.4 4 0 Thus, Scalia
wrote, interpreting Jackson to assume that those waivers are coerced is in-
correct.44 1 The majority overturned Jackson, citing not only that it is un-
workable,442 but also that it is unnecessary because the right to counsel is
protected under both Miranda and Edwards.4 4 3 In other words, the protec-
tions afforded defendants through Fifth Amendment rulings are sufficient
to protect a Sixth Amendment right.
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy, filed a concurring opinion
criticizing the minority4 44 for placing value on the concept of stare decisis in
this case while earlier in the term, the same justices voted to overturn
Court precedents with a longer history than Jackson."5
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Souter, dis-
sented and argued that the majority had misread the rationale behind Jack-
son and had placed too little value on precedent.4 4 6 Stevens contended
that Jackson was intended to ensure that individuals obtain their Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and stated, "If a defendant is entitled to pro-
tection from police-initiated interrogation under the Sixth Amendment
when he merely requests a lawyer, he is even more obviously entitled to
such protection when he has secured a lawyer."4 47 The notion of prevent-
ing police badgering once a defendant has requested counsel is not men-
tioned in Jackson as a rationale for the ruling, which instead is wholly
predicated on protecting Sixth Amendment rights generally.448 Stevens
sharply contended that once the proper purpose behind Jackson, as a Sixth
Amendment protection rather than an anti-badgering measure, is under-
stood, the majority's logic in overturning Jackson begins to "crumble." 4 49
Finally, Stevens argued that even without the protections of the Jackson
decision, Montejo's Sixth Amendment rights were violated and that the
decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court should be reversed. 450 As Ste-
vens concluded:
439. Id. at 2086.
440. Id. at 2086-87.
441. Id. at 2086, 2088.
442. Id. at 2088.
443. Id. at 2089-90.
444. Id. at 2092-93 (Alito, J., concurring).
445. Id. at 2093 (Alito, J., concurring). Alito noted, "The dissent, finally, invokes Jackson's antiq-
uity, stating that "the 23-year existence of a simple bright-line rule" should weigh in favor of its reten-
tion. But in Gant, the Court had no compunction about casting aside a 28-year-old bright-line rule. I
can only assume that the dissent thinks that our constitutional precedents are like certain wines, which
are most treasured when they are neither too young nor too old, and that Jackson, at 23, is in its prime,
whereas Belton, at 28, had turned brownish and vinegary." Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2093; see Arizona v.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), discussed infra with other 5-to-4 liberal decision.
446. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2094 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
447. Id. at 2095 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
448. Id. at 2096 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
449. Id. at 2097 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
450. Id. at 2199 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The Court's decision to overrule Jackson is unwarranted.
Not only does it rest on a flawed doctrinal premise, but also
the dubious benefits it hopes to achieve are far outweighed
by the damage it does to the rule of law and the integrity of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Moreover, even
apart from the protections afforded by Jackson, the police
interrogation in this case violated Jesse Montejo's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.451
Turning to the Court's liberal, split decisions, a slim majority held that
United States military courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of coram nobis
in United States v. Denedo.4 5 2 Jacob Denedo, a native of Nigeria, pled guilty
of fraud under the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1998.453 In 2006,
based on his guilty plea, the Department of Homeland Security sought to
deport Denedo.454 Denedo then requested the military court that had ac-
cepted his plea to issue a writ of coram nobis under the justification that
Denedo had been provided ineffective assistance of counsel in that his
counsel had guaranteed that a guilty plea would not lead to deportation.455
The only questions at issue in this case dealt with jurisdiction: does the
United States Supreme Court have jurisdiction to hear the complaint 456
and do military courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of coram nobis re-
garding a challenge to a previous, final decision.457 Justice Kennedy's ma-
jority opinion for Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer found both
courts have jurisdiction, allowing the case to proceed on the merits of
Denedo's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 458 Chief Justice Roberts'
filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas and
Alito contending that while the Supreme Court did have jurisdiction to
review the action of military courts, the military courts do not have jurisdic-
tion to issue writs of coram nobis.4 5 9
Justice Kennedy's views were again a key factor in the Court's ruling
in Corley v. United States.460 The Court ruled in Corley that voluntary con-
fessions could be suppressed if more than six hours have passed between
the arrest and confession and if the defendant has not yet appeared before
a magistrate. 4 61 Decades ago in McNabb v. United States,462 and Mallory v.
451. Id. at 2101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
452. 129 S. Ct. 2213 (2009) (defining "The writ of coram nobis [a]s an ancient common-law rem-
edy designed 'to correct errors of fact."').
453. Id. at 2218.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 2219.
457. Id. at 2218.
458. Id. at 2223-24.
459. Id. at 2225 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
460. 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009).
461. Id. at 1566, 1571.
462. 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
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United States,463 the Court ruled to suppress otherwise voluntary confes-
sions obtained following unreasonable delays in bringing a defendant
before a magistrate. Then in 1968, Congress passed a federal statute that
held in part that voluntary confessions are admissible even if certain due
process protections are not in place (e.g., reading of Miranda rights) 4 6 4 and,
[a] confession made . . . by ... a defendant therein, while
such person was under arrest . . . , shall not be inadmissible
solely because of delay in bringing such person before a
magistrate judge . . . if such confession is found by the trial
judge to have been made voluntarily . .. and if such confes-
sion was made . . . within six hours [of arrest]. 4 65
The question left open, and the one addressed by the Court in this
case, is if congressional statute superseded the Court's mandate in McNabb
and Mallory and allowed all voluntary confessions, or if the statute simply
narrowed the reach of the ruling so that voluntary confessions obtained
prior to the six-hour mandate could be admitted.466
The case facts indicate that Johnnie Corley was arrested at 8 a.m., held
until about 11:45 a.m. when he was taken to the hospital to treat minor
cuts, and was then taken to an FBI office at 3:30 p.m. where agents began
to question him.4 67 At 5:27 p.m. Corley began to confess but later re-
quested a break at 6:30 p.m. 468 He was held overnight and questioning
resumed the next morning.469 Corley confessed in writing and finally was
taken to see at magistrate at 1:30 p.m.-29.5 hours after he was initially
arrested.470 The Court of Appeals affirmed that Corley's confession could
be used, holding that it was bound by congressional statute, which the ap-
pellate court determined had replaced the Supreme Court's rulings in Mc-
Nabb and Mallory.471 The Court of Appeals held that confessions could be
admitted if those confessions were voluntary.472
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter found fault with the appellate
court's decision, holding instead that voluntary confessions within six hours
of arrest are permissible, but those obtained after the six-hour threshold
might be suppressed consistent with the Court's McNabb and Mallory
precedents. 4 7 3 Souter's opinion was joined by Justices Breyer, Stevens,
Ginsburg and Kennedy. Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
463. 354 U. S. 449 (1957).
464. Corley, 129 S. Ct. at 1563 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3501(a) (2006)).
465. Corley, 129 S. Ct. at 1564 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §3501(c)).
466. Id.






473. Id. at 1571.
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Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented.4 74 Alito argued that the meaning of
the congressional statute was clear,47 5-regardless of whether or not it was
intended to replace the Court's McNabb and Mallory mandates-and al-
lows for all voluntary confessions to be admissible in a court of law.476
The Court ruled in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts477 that the state's
practice of merely introducing scientific reports into evidence without al-
lowing defendants the ability to cross-examine the experts producing those
reports violated the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Luis
Melendez-Diaz was arrested during a narcotics sale.47 8 Along with two
others, Melendez-Diaz was driven to the police station in a police cruiser,
and during the ride he was seen fidgeting in the cruiser's back seat.4 79 Po-
lice searched the back seat and found 19 small bags between a partition
separating the front and back seats.480 Police then sent those bags for test-
ing to determine the contents. 48 1 At trial, prosecutors introduced the lab
test indicating the substance in the police car was cocaine.48 2 Melendez-
Diaz objected to the introduction of the reports because the analysts pro-
ducing the reports were not present to testify. 483 Melendez-Diaz was found
guilty and he appealed, eventually reaching the Supreme Court on the
claim that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him
had been violated by the introduction of the reports written by analysts
that he was unable to cross-examine.484
Writing for Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg, Justice
Scalia agreed a Sixth Amendment violation had taken place.485 Scalia
noted that the Court determined in Crawford v. Washington48 6 that defend-
ants have a right to cross examine witnesses against them and if that condi-
tion is not met, the testimony of the witness is inadmissible, unless the
witness is unavailable.487 Scalia further found that the reports indicating
that the substance was cocaine were testimonial in nature and, conse-
quently, the analysts were witnesses.488 Failure to produce them was a
Sixth Amendment violation.489
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer
and Alito, dissented.490 Kennedy argued that the Court failed to give due
474. Id. at 1571 (Alito, J., dissenting).
475. Id. at 1572 (Alito, J., dissenting).
476. Id. at 1575 (Alito, J., dissenting).
477. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).




482. Id. at 2531.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 2532.
486. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
487. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531.
488. Id. at 2532.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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weight to precedent and common practice because for over 90 years re-
ports have been introduced as evidence without also producing the analysts
as witnesses.491 Kennedy noted that precedent cited by the Court, namely
Crawford, was established recently (2004) and did not address forensic
technicians.492 Therefore, reliance on that ruling to overturn a century of
jurisprudence was misguided.49 3 Kennedy protested, "It is remarkable that
the Court so confidently disregards a century of jurisprudence. We learn
now that we have misinterpreted the Confrontation Clause-hardly an ar-
cane or seldom-used provision of the Constitution-for the first 218 years
of its existence." 49 4 Kennedy maintained that there is a difference between
'conventional witnesses' for whom confrontation is required and lab techni-
cians and others who are not directly involved in the events leading to the
defendant's conviction. 495 Kennedy argued that there is no clear definition
of analyst, making the ruling impossible to apply.496 He also asserted that
the majority failed to clarify if all personnel performing the most minuscule
of duties that may have contributed to the result were also required to
testify, or just the final individual responsible for putting all the evidence
together in the form of a report.4 97 The Court's ruling, Kennedy argued,
greatly damages the workings of the criminal justice system. 49 8 Because of
its far-reaching practical impact, Melendez Diaz v. Massachusetts is likely to
be one of the most controversial criminal justices cases of the year.
Arizona v. Gant499 provided another unusual clustering of justices as
Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Souter in
providing greater protections to the criminally accused while Justice Breyer
broke with his usual liberal allies to join Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Alito and Kennedy in dissent. The case addressed the permissibility of po-
lice searches conducted of cars during an arrest when officers have already
secured the defendant.50 0 Rodney Gant was arrested for driving with a
suspended license.50 1 The police handcuffed Gant and placed him in the
back of a police cruiser and, incident to the arrest, started searching Gant's
car, in which they found cocaine.502 Gant was arrested for drug possession
charges, including paraphernalia. 03 Gant moved to suppress the cocaine as
illegally obtained but the trial court allowed search as incident to a valid
arrest.504
491. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
492. Id. at 2543-44 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
493. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
494. Id. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
495. Id. at 2543, 2548-49 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
496. Id. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
497. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
498. Id. at 2546 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
499. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
500. Id. at 1716.
501. Id. at 1714.
502. Id.
503. Id. at 1715.
504. Id.
43
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
The Court authorized searches incident to an arrest as valid exceptions
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in Chimel v. California505
to protect officer safety and ensure defendants could not dispose of evi-
dence, and were extended to car searches by the High Court in New York
v. Belton.so6 Searches incident to an arrest are limited in scope; for exam-
ple, they are only permissible in areas where the defendant might be able
to obtain access.o 7 Because Gant was not able remove items from his car
while handcuffed and in a police car, the Arizona Supreme Court held the
search to be unconstitutional50 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens found merit in Gant's argu-
ment. Stevens noted that while Belton authorized car searches incident to
arrest, it did not address if officers could search subsequent to an arrest if
the crime scene had been secured and the defendant did not pose a danger
to officer. 509 Finding that the underlying rationale for the original decision
in Chimel was to protect officers by removing from a defendant's immedi-
ate surroundings any material which could be used as a weapon or de-
stroyed as evidence, Stevens held that warrantless searches incident to
arrests are not legitimate if there is no danger to officers and if there is no
chance a defendant can destroy evidence.5 '0 Further, the extension of
Chimel's logic to car searches in Belton also was largely predicated on the
goal of protecting officers.5 11 Belton concerned the search of a car by a
lone police officer while four unsecured car occupants stood nearby.512
Stevens noted the Court's decision allowing searches of the car's compart-
ments was to ensure that hidden weapons could not be accessed by one of
the four arrestees.5 1 3 While Belton had been generally interpreted as au-
thorizing the search of an entire car incident to an arrest, Stevens' majority
opinion declared that the Court was using Gant to clarify the scope of per-
missible searches under Belton.51 4
Stevens held that rather than permit the search of an entire car, the
principles underlying both Chimel and Belton must be respected in future
car searches. 515 Car searches are permissible incident to an arrest if the
officer has a reasonable belief that a search is necessary to secure officer
safety or evidence.51 6 It was an inaccurate reading of Belton, the majority
505. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
506. 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
507. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716-17.
508. Id. at 1715.





514. Id. at 1716, 1719; see also id. at 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the opinion as "artifi-
cial narrowing").
515. Id. at 1719.
516. Id.
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held, to assert that precedent authorized searches absent any safety or evi-
dentiary justification." As Stevens noted, "Accordingly, we reject this
reading of Belton and hold that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to
search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arres-
tee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compart-
ment at the time of the search.""s Further, Stevens warned that searches
of cars absent Chimel justifications are not permissible simply to support a
law enforcement interest in creating a bright-line rule to follow over a de-
fendant's limited privacy interest regarding the contents of a car.5 19 Finally,
Stevens charged that principles of stare decisis should not be used to permit
the continuance of unconstitutional police practices simply because those
practices have been allowed in the past.520 Justice Scalia filed a concurring
opinion.521
Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that the Court should not upset al-
most three decades of police practice and should respect the precedent es-
tablished in Belton.5 22 Justice Alito also filed a dissenting opinion that was
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy in full and in part by
Justice Breyer.52 3 Justice Alito argued that Belton was well established and
should be respected, and that the Court's decision here undermines police
investigations and endangers police officers' lives. 2 Alito noted that
while those in the majority do not admit it, 52 5 they have overturned Belton,
and have not simply clarified or modified the ruling.526 Alito concluded
that the Court overturned a long-standing precedent without adequate jus-
tification or cause.527
IV. CONCLUSION
This examination of the Supreme Court's criminal justice decisions
from the 2008-2009 term revealed a typical pattern of decision making with
respect to the liberal-conservative voting patterns of individual justices on
the Roberts Court. Although the specific mix of issues apparently reduced
the rates of inter-agreement among the justices, there were no major sur-
prises with respect to the predominance of conservative outcomes and the
number of cases that produced 5-to-4 decisions in a Court that is divided
between well-defined conservative and liberal wings.
In looking at the Court's decisions, it is difficult to conclude that any of
the recent term's decisions will have a dramatic impact on criminal justice
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Id. at 1720-21.
520. Id. at 1722.
521. Id. at 1724 (Scalia, J., concurring).
522. Id. at 1726 (Bryer, J., dissenting).
523. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
524. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
525. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
526. Id. at 1727 (Alito, J., dissenting).
527. Id. at 1727-31 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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processes. The Court modestly reduced police authority to search automo-
biles in one 5-to-4 case,5 28 but in another case a five-member majority mod-
estly expanded the authority of police to question detained suspects
outside of the presence of their appointed counsel. 2 The Court's narrow
and controversial rejection of a prisoner's asserted due process right to test
preserved DNA evidence merely maintained the current state of the law530
and the protection of students against strip searches in schools presumably
affects relatively few schools and students that had actually experienced
such practices.3 1
The justices' opinions in the most recent term may be most important
in providing ammunition for debates that will occur in future cases. For
example, will Chief Justice Roberts's minimization of the exclusionary
rule's impact and importance provide a basis for further reductions in the
rule's coverage in future cases? 532 Will the strong federalism arguments
put forward by Chief Justice Roberts to oppose a due process right to DNA
testing5 33 either affect his decision or the arguments used by other justices
when the Court considers whether the limited Second Amendment federal
right to keep a handgun in one's home5 34 should be applied to gun control
laws of states and cities?5 35 Will the back-and-forth debate about stare de-
cisis between Justice Stevens536 and Justice Alito that emerged in 2009 con-
tinue or be joined by other justices in the next term's cases? 53 7
An additional important question concerns the changes that will result
from Justice Souter's retirement. Will Justice Sotomayor, a former prose-
cutor, adopt a different approach than that of her predecessor? For exam-
ple, will her arrival at the Court alter any future reexamination of the cases
in which Souter was a member of five-member majorities that strengthened
the right to confrontation, 3 expanded protections against automobile
searches,53 9 and preserved the exclusion of incriminating statements by fed-
eral detainees who were not promptly brought to court for their initial ap-
pearances? 540 Moreover, Professor Douglas Berman speculates that the
prosecutorial backgrounds of the Court's two newest members, Sotomayor
and Alito, may contribute to the increase in the Court's acceptance of crim-
inal justice cases for its 2009-2010 docket.5 4 1 According to Berman, these
528. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
529. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
530. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
531. Safford v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009)
532. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
533. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
534. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
535. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).
536. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2099 n.5 (2009) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
537. Id. at 2092-93 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring).
538. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
539. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
540. Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009).
541. Douglas Berman, Should we thank new Justices Alito and Sotomayor for all of the big crimi-
nal law SCOTUS action?, SENTENCING POLICY AND LAW BLOG, Oct. 13, 2009, http://sentenc-
ing.typepad.com
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justices "are likely to find a range of criminal law topics inherently more
interesting than their colleagues, and they also likely understand more fully
how important clarity and certainty is to the work of all criminal justice
practitioners. "S42 Berman's observation implicitly reiterates the question
of whether Sotomayor's decision making in criminal justice cases will differ
from that of Justice Souter. However, the fact that former prosecutor Alito
was the justice least likely to be given a majority-opinion writing assign-
ment in criminal justice cases (see Table 2) may indicate that other justices
are not necessarily inclined to regard prior professional experience as in-
dicative of special expertise. Of course, it remains to be seen how
Sotomayor will vote in criminal justice cases and whether she will be given
more than her share of opinion-writing assignments.
542. Id.
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